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DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTS,
GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: WHAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN
(AND CAN'T) DO TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC'S
HEALTH
GAIL H. JAVITr,* ERICA STANLEY,** AND KATHY HUDSON***
L Introduction
In the past few years, advisory bodies and public health advocates in both
the United States and abroad have raised concerns about marketing' genetic
tests directly to consumers. In the United States, the Secretary's Advisory
Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS),2 which advises the
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1. One definition of marketing is "the process or technique of promoting, selling, and
distributing a product or service; an aggregate of functions involved in moving goods from
producer to consumer." MERRIAM-WEBSTERONLINE DICTIONARY, at http://www.m-w.com (last
visited Aug. 23, 2004). This definition encompasses the advertising of the product to gain
consumer awareness and foster consumer demand, and the steps of transferring the good or
service from seller to buyer.
2. Establishment of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society,
67 Fed. Reg. 65,126 (Oct. 23, 2002); CHARTER OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE
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Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), indicated
that the issue would be a priority of the group.3 In the past two years,
government-sponsored reports in the United Kingdom,4 Canada,5 and
Australia6 have advocated stricter controls on direct-to-consumer (DTC)
marketing of genetic tests. Most recently, the American College of Medical
Genetics issued a policy statement recommending that genetic testing "should
ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY (Sept. 23, 2002), at http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghsl
SACGHScharter.pdf. The SACGHS replaced the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetic
Testing (SACGT), see SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMrITEE ON GENETIC TESTING, at
http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/sacgt/aboutsacgt.htm, which in 2000, issued a report calling for
greater regulation of genetic testing by the federal government, see ENHANCING THE OVERSIGHT
OF GENETIC TESTS: RECOMMENDATIONS OFTHE SACGT (2000), at http://www4.od.nih.gov/obal
sacgt/reports/oversight-report.pdf.
3. At its inaugural meeting, the SACGHS requested to hear testimony from several federal
agencies concerning oversight of genetic tests. Notice of Meeting, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,044 (May
29, 2003). Representatives of several government agencies, including the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and National Institutes of Health
(NIH), testified at the Committee's October 2003 meeting. Notice of Meeting and Request for
Public Comment, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,171 (Sept. 9, 2003). Transcripts of these meetings are
available at http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/SACGhsMTG_Past.htm.
4. In March 2003, the United Kingdom's Human Genetics Commission - an independent
advisory body examining social and ethical issues in human genetics - issued a report
addressing whether genetic tests should be promoted directly to the public. The report made
several recommendations, including that most genetic tests that provide predictive health
information should not be offered directly to the public and that the government should ensure
that consumers are provided accurate information about genetic testing services. HUMAN
GENETICS COMM'N, GENES DIRECT: ENSURING THE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTS
SUPPLIED DIRECTLY TO THE PUBLIC § § 3.32, 3.57-3.62 (Mar. 2003), at http://www.hgc.gov.uk/
genesdirect/genesdirectjfull.pdf.
5. In 2002, the Ontario Government issued a report to the Provinces and Territories
discussing concerns similar to the concerns raised over pharmceuticals. The report addressed
(1) the potential impact of DTC advertising of genetic testing from U.S. media on Canadian
perceptions and demands with regard to genetic testing services, and (2) whether DTC
advertising undermines the patient-provider educational and counseling relationship. The report
recommended that the federal government enact legislation to prohibit or limit direct marketing
of genetic testing. ONTARIO MINISTRY OFHEALTH & LONG-TERM CARE, GENETICS, TESTING &
GENE PATENTING: CHARTINGNEWTERRITORY IN HEALTHCARE § 8.5 (Jan. 2002), athttp://www.
health.gov.on.calenglish/public/pubfministry-reports/geneticsrep02/report-e.pdf.
6. While the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and the Australian Health
Ethics Commission (AHEC) recognized the difficulty of regulating the distribution of products
over the Internet, they issued a report in 2003 that favored limitations on the marketing of
genetic tests over the Internet. ALRC & AHEC, ESSENTIALLY YOURS: THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN GENETIC INFORMATION IN AUSTRALIA (2003), at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/
alrc/publications/reports/96/. The report stemmed from an inquiry established by the Australian




be provided to the public only through the services of an appropriately
qualified health care professional." 7
Several concerns have been raised regarding the marketing of genetic tests
directly to consumers. It has been argued that DTC marketing is confusing to
consumers because it: (1) fails to adequately explain complex genetic infor-
mation; (2) is misleading in its failure to disclose the risks and limitations of
testing; (3) allows tests without established clinical validity or utility to be
promoted; and (4) does not include the counseling needed to put test results
in proper context.' On the positive side, however, even those opposed to DTC
marketing acknowledge its potential to provide consumers with greater
awareness about testing options and relevant medical information.9
Critics of DTC marketing raise concerns about the sale of genetic tests
directly to consumers and the advertising of these tests to consumers. In
reality, however, these marketing activities require separate legal analysis.
With respect to the sale of consumer products and services in the United
States, particularly those products with an impact on health, the government
has the legal authority to use several different regulatory tools to limit
consumer access and protect public health.'" Government oversight of genetic
7. American College ofMedical Genetics Board of Directors, A CMG Statement on Direct-
to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 6 GENETICS MED. 60, 60 (2004).
8. Sarah E. Gollust et al., Limitations of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising for Clinical
Genetic Testing, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1762 (Oct. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Gollust et al.,
Limitations]; see also Sarah E. Gollust et al., Direct-to-Consumer Sales of Genetic Services on
the Internet, 5 GENETICS MED. 332 (2003) [hereinafter Gollust et al., Sales]; Sara Chandros Hull
& Kiran Prasad, Reading Between the Lines: Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Genetic
Testing, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 31, 33 (May-June 2001); Bryn Williams-Jones, Where There's
a Web, There's a Way: Commercial Genetic Testing and the Internet, 6 COMMUNITY GENETICS
46, 54 (2003).
9. Gollust et al., Limitations, supra note 8, at 1762; Gollust et al., Sales, supra note 8, at
332; Williams-Jones, supra note 8, at 54.
10. One mechanism the federal government uses is its power to allocate or withhold
funding to the states. For example, in 1984, Congress passed the Uniform Drinking Age Act,
which mandated reduced federal transportation funds to states that failed to raise the minimum
legal drinking age to twenty-one. Uniform Drinking Age Act § 6(a), Pub. L. No. 98-363, 98
Stat. 435, 437 (1984) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2000)); AM. MED. ASS'N, THE MINIMUM
LEGAL DRINKING AGE: FACTS AND FALLACIES, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/
3566-3640.html (last updated Apr. 2, 2004). Similarly, in 1992, Congress passed the Synar
Amendment, which requires states to pass and enforce laws prohibiting the sale and distribution
of tobacco products to persons under the age of eighteen. Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental
Health Reorganization Act, tit. VIII, § 801, Pub. L. No. 102-321, 106 Stat. 323, 441-42 (1992)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (2000)). The statute mandated up to a 40% reduction in
federal funds to noncomplying states for the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block
Grant. 45 C.F.R. § 96.1(d) (2003); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SYNAR
AMENDMENT: PROTECTING THE NATION'S YOUTH FROM NICOTINE ADDICTION, at http://
2004]
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testing services, however, currently falls between several regulatory "cracks"
within the federal government, and is therefore arguably both ambiguous and
insufficient. As this Article discusses, most genetic tests do not require
approval before they can be sold. Although the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulates a small number of tests, it has refrained from
regulating most genetic tests, in part because its jurisdiction to do so is
unclear. Furthermore, while the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) oversees laboratories providing genetic testing services, this oversight
is quite limited.
With respect to advertising - the communication of information to
promote the sale of lawful products or services - government regulation is
subject to the constraints of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
which prohibits the government from "abridging the freedom of speech.""
Historically, the First Amendment has been recognized to prohibit government
censorship of political, social, scientific, or artistic expression. Since the
1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to include
"commercial speech," which is speech solely intended to sell products or
services." Moreover, in recent years the Court has imposed an increasingly
high burden of proof on government attempts to restrict commercial speech,
even when the government has asserted a public health objective, as discussed
in Part VI of this Article.
Though some DTC marketing critics have advocated restricting the
advertising of genetic tests through television, the Internet, and print media,
any such restrictions must be consistent with the constraints imposed by the
First Amendment, particularly in light of recent Supreme Courtjurisprudence.
This Article analyzes the extent to which the government may lawfully
restrain advertising of genetic tests directly to consumers. Further, this Article
argues that a court would likely hold the government's attempt to categorically
prohibit such advertising unconstitutional if challenged in court. Limited
restrictions on advertising could potentially withstand judicial scrutiny, but
prevention.samhsa.gov/tobacco.
State governments use their police powers to promote public health through a variety of
mechanisms, such as inspections of commercial and residential premises, and licensing of health
care providers. LAWRENCE 0. GoSTIN, PUBUC HEALTH LAW, POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 50-51
(2000).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." Id.
12. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined "commercial speech" as speech that does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction" or service. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
[Vol. 57:251
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only if supported by adequate evidence demonstrating the link between such
restrictions and protecting consumers, and if carefully tailored to achieve that
goal. The government could require the use of disclaimers to prevent
consumer confusion or deception, and although this approach would likely
succeed from a constitutional standpoint, it may be the least satisfying to some
public health advocates.
Part II of this Article defines genetic testing and describes the array of
genetic tests currently available. Part UI1 addresses the concerns that have
been raised regarding the potential for harm from both DTC advertising and
direct consumer access to genetic testing services. Part IV discusses the
current regulatory status of genetic tests, with particular emphasis on the role
of various agencies within HHS in regulating the sale of these products. Part
V discusses the regulation of DTC prescription drug advertising in the United
States and the extent to which this model is applicable to advertising of
genetic tests to consumers. Part VI reviews the commercial speech doctrine
as it has evolved through Supreme Court and lower court decisions. Finally,
Part VII analyzes the types of advertising restrictions that a court may find
constitutional and identifies the governmental entities that could potentially
implement such regulations.
II. The Current Status of Genetic Testing
A. What Are Genes
Genes serve as the basic building blocks of heredity and provide the
blueprint for growth and development.' 3  Genes are made up of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), which is composed of individual units called
nucleotides. 4 The particular arrangement of the nucleotides constitutes a
code that the body can translate to produce specific proteins. 5 Each protein
has a unique structure and a specific function in the body.' 6 Different genes
are active in different cell types, depending on what protein products are
required.'7
The human genome comprises about thirty thousand to fifty thousand genes
that are arranged into structures called chromosomes. 8 All cells in the human
body, except sperm and egg cells, contain twenty-three pairs of chromosomes,
13. ROBERT H. TAMARIN, PRINCIPLES OFGENETICS 9-10 (5th ed. 1996).
14. JAMES THOMPSON &MARGARET THOMPSON, GENETICS IN MEDICINE 17, 20 (Robert L.
Nussbaum et al. eds., W.B. Saunders Co. 5th ed. 2001) (1966).
15. Id. at 18-24.
16. TAMARIN, supra note 13, at 195-97.
17. THOMPSON & THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 10.
18. Id. at 203.
2004]
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or forty-six total chromosomes. 9 The first twenty-two chromosome pairs hold
the instructions for the body's growth, development, and proper functioning."0
The last pair holds the instructions that determine sex. Males usually have
one X and one Y chromosome, while females typically have two X
chromosomes.'
Individuals inherit genetic information from their biological parents. Half
of the genetic information comes from the mother, and the other half comes
from the father.22 Sperm and egg cells, also known as gametes, each carry a
single copy of each chromosome.2 When sperm and egg combine during
fertilization, the resulting cell contains a new and complete genome. This cell
now has forty-six chromosomes and, under the right conditions, can develop
into an embryo, fetus, and ultimately a child.24
B. Genetic Basis of Disease
Scientists increasingly believe that most, if not all diseases, or human
responses to diseases, likely have a genetic component.25 Genetic disorders
can arise from abnormalities in a chromosome or in a gene. 26 Chromosomal
abnormalities can be numerical, with either too many or too few of each
chromosome within cells,27 or structural, meaning some change in the
structure of the chromosome.2 ' Gene mutations involve changes to the DNA
sequence of a single gene.29 Some mutations will lead to disease, whereas
others will increase a person's risk of future disease.
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. TAMARIN, supra note 13, at 46.
23. Id.
24. THOMPSON & THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 5.
25. Id. at 181.
26. Id. at 79.
27. Id. at 79-80. Examples of conditions caused by numerical mutations are Down
Syndrome, the result of an extra chromosome number 21 (forty-seven total chromosomes), and
Turner Syndrome, the result of a missing X chromosome (forty-five total chromosomes).
TAMARIN, supra note 13, at 182-83.
28. THOMPSON & THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 79-80. Structural abnormalities include:
(1) translocations (in which segments of DNA are exchanged between two different
chromosomes); (2) inversions (in which a portion of the chromosome flips its orientation with
respect to the rest of the chromosome); (3) deletions (in which a segment of the chromosome
is lost); and (4) duplications (in which a segment of the chromosome is repeated). Id. at 79,
140-44. Changes in segments of the chromosome can lead to changes in the way the genes
housed on those chromosomes are expressed. TAMARIN, supra note 13, at 168-77.




C. What Is a Genetic Test
A genetic test is the laboratory analysis of DNA, RNA, chromosomes, or
gene products.3° In healthcare, such analysis is conducted to detect genetic
abnormalities associated with a disease or condition.3' Currently, more than
seven hundred genetic tests are available for clinical use.32
A health care provider may order a genetic test for one of several reasons:
(1) to identify carriers of genetic disease; (2) to test embryos, fetuses, and
newborns for disease-causing genetic abnormalities; (3) to establish clinical
diagnoses or prognoses and inform clinical care; (4) to determine whether
there is increased risk of developing a disease in the future; or (5) to predict
response to a medication.33 Genetic testing can be conducted at any stage in
the developmental lifecycle.
Genetic tests can detect not only genetic changes associated with disease,
but also normal variants within a gene, or traits. For example, genetic tests
can be used to identify whether a person's tissue type will match that of a
person needing a tissue transplant. As more genetic tests are developed, it is
likely that more genetic contributors to traits will be detectable through
testing.
30. GENETESTS, What Is Genetic Testing, in EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS, at http://www.
genetests.org (updated weekly) [hereinafter What Is Genetic Testing]. RNA stands for
ribonucleic acid. It is formed upon a DNA template and contains ribose instead of deoxyribose.
There are several different types of RNA, including Messenger RNA (MRNA), which is the
template on which polypeptides are synthesized. THOMPSON & THOMPSON, supra note 14, at
411.
31. What Is Genetic Testing, supra note 30. Genetic testing is used in other contexts as
well. For example, forensic scientists use DNA "fingerprinting" to identify potential crime
suspects, exonerate persons wrongly accused of crimes, and identify crime and catastrophe
victims. Genetic testing is also used to establish paternity. See, e.g., BADGER-HAWKEYE RED
CROSS, at http://www.a2zdna.com (last visited Apr. 14, 2004); DATAGENE, at http://www.data
gene.com (last visited Apr. 14, 2004); GENELEX, at http://www.genelex.com (last visited Apr.
14, 2004); SERVICES/PRODUCTS, DNA/PRINTGENOMICS, at http://www.dnaprint.com (last
visited Apr. 14, 2004) [hereinafter DNA PRINT]. Genetic tests are also being used to trace the
origins of different racial and ethnic groups by examining normal variations in DNA, known as
polymorphisms. See, e.g., AFRICAN ANCESTRY, at http://www.africanancestry.com (last visited
Apr. 14, 2004); DNA PRINT, supra; GENELEX, supra. The analysis is performed on a biological
sample such as blood, cells from the inside of the cheek, or fetal cells in amniotic fluid. LYNN
B. JORDEETAL., MEDICALGENETICS 218-19 (Emma D. Underdown ed., Mosby-Year Book, Inc.
1995).
32. GENETESTS, at http://www.genetests.org (updated weekly). Clinical genetic tests
examine specimens to diagnose, prevent, or treat individual patients. Research genetic tests
examine specimens for the purpose of understanding a condition or developing a clinical test.
Id.
33. GENETESTS, Uses of Genetic Testing, in EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS, at http://www.
genetests.org (updated weekly) [hereinafter Uses of Genetic Testing].
2004]
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D. Types of Genetic Testing
Carrier testing identifies unaffected individuals who carry a recessive
mutation, which is a change in one copy of a particular gene. A health care
provider may recommend a carrier test because an individual has a known
family history of a particular disease, or because the individual is a member
of a population known to be at higher risk for a disease.34 In the United States,
carrier testing is most frequently offered to patients who are planning
pregnancy or who are already pregnant.35
Prenatal tests are used to detect a genetic abnormality in a developing
fetus.36 Prenatal screening tests indicate the probability that a fetus is affected
by a particular genetic condition or birth defect.37 Screening tests include
maternal blood tests38 and ultrasound examinations.39 If a screening test
shows an increased risk, the mother may be offered genetic testing to
determine whether the fetus actually has a genetic abnormality. Chorionic
Villus Sampling (CVS) and amniocentesis are among the most common
procedures used to obtain a sample of fetal cells that can be tested for genetic
abnormalities.4n
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), the newest form of reproductive
34. JORDE ET AL., supra note 31, at 210. There are many examples of this type of screening:
cystic fibrosis screening in Caucasians, sickle-cell disease screening in African Americans,
thalassemia screening in Asians and individuals of Mediterranean decent, and Tay-Sachs disease
screening in Ashkenazi Jews.
35. Id. at 218.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 218-19.
38. For example, the maternal serum alpha-fetoprotein (MSAFP) test examines alpha-
fetoprotein, a substance produced by the fetus that circulates in the mother's blood. Decreased
levels can indicate an increased risk for Down syndrome. Physicians commonly screen three
or four proteins in the mother's blood (called either a triple screen or a quadruple screen) to
screen for Down syndrome, trisomy 18, and Turner syndrome. Peter A. Benn, Advances in
Prenatal Screening for Down Syndrome: I. General Principles and Second Trimester Testing,
323 CLINICA CHIMICA ACTA 1, 3, 8 (2002).
39. Ultrasound examines the fetus by high frequency sound waves. It is routinely used to
estimate fetal viability, the number of fetuses present, the position of the fetus, and fetal age.
Fetal structures can also be examined depending on the age of the fetus and the extent of the
evaluation, and some fetal malformations can be detected in utero. For example, an increase in
nuchal fold thickness is correlated with an increased risk for Down syndrome, and neural tube
and heart malformations can also be detected on ultrasound. When an abnormality is seen on
ultrasound, amniocentesis or other invasive testing can be performed to sample fetal tissue and
determine whether the abnormality is associated with a genetic disorder. Id.; see also
GENETESTS, Fetal Ultrasound Examination, in EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS, at http://www.
genetests.org (updated weekly).




genetic testing, is used to detect a genetic abnormality in an embryo created
through in vitro fertilization.4' This technique has been used to inform the
selection of embryos that do not have a particular genetic abnormality and to
select for particular traits, such as a tissue type that matches an ailing sibling
or a particular sex.4
Newborn screening of infants can be used to identify genetic conditions and
metabolic disorders shortly after birth. In many conditions, early detection
and treatment prevent lifelong impairment or death. Newborn screening is
typically performed as part of state public health programs.
43 The most
common disorders screened for are phenylketonuria (PKU), congenital
hypothyroidism, galactosemia, and sickle cell disease.'
Diagnostic testing is used to identify or confirm the diagnosis of a disease
or condition in an affected individual.45 This type of testing may be useful to
help predict the course of a disease, determine the choice of treatment, and
provide recurrence risk information to affected individuals and their family
members.46
41. In PGD, one cell from a six- or eight-celled embryo is biopsied, and the DNA is
analyzed. Because it requires examination of an embryo outside the woman's body, PGD can
be performed only in conjunction with in vitro fertilization. The error rate for PGD is estimated
to be from 1% to 10% depending on the particular disease and testing mechanism used. AM.
SOC'Y FORREPROD. MED. (ASRM) & SOC'Y FOR ASSISTEDREPROD. TECH. (SART), APRACTICE
COMMITTEE REPORT: PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS 2 (2001). Accordingly, it is often
recommended that PGD diagnosis be followed by CVS or amniocentesis. PGD was initially
developed so that couples who were carriers of specific genetic mutations could avoid having
a child with a genetic disease. It is also being used to screen for aneuploidy (incorrect number
of chromosomes) in embryos of women undergoing IVF. See, e.g., Anver Kuliev & Yury
Verlinsky, The Role of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis in Women ofAdvanced Reproductive
Age, 15 CURRENT OPINIONS IN OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 233 (2003); Santiago Munne,
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Human Implantation - A Review, 24 PLACENTA S70,
S70-S71 (2003).
42. For a broad discussion of PGD, its history, uses, and policy implications, see GENETICS
& PUB. POLICY CTR., PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS: A DISCUSSION OF CHALLENGES,
CONCERNS, AND PRELIMINARY POLICY OPTIONS RELATED TO THE GENETIC TESTING OF HUMAN
EMBRYOS (2004), at http://www.dnapolicy.org/downloads/pdfslpolicy-pgd.pdf.
43. All states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands implement
mandatory newborn screening programs. However, no federal standard exists and the number
of disorders tested varies by state. Some states screen for as few as three conditions, while other
states test up to thirty conditions. Most state programs, however, test for between four and ten
disorders. JORDE ETAL., supra note 31, at 213; NAT'LNEWBORN SCREENING& GENETICS RES.
CTR., U.S. NATIONAL SCREENING STATUS REPORT, at http://genes-r-us.uthscsa.edu/resources/
newborn/screenstatus.htm (last updated Mar. 30, 2004).
44. JORDE ET AL., supra note 31, at 213-14.
45. Uses of Genetic Testing, supra note 33.
46. Id.
20041
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Presymptomatic, or predictive genetic testing, identifies individuals
carrying a mutation in a gene for which that person does not currently
manifest any symptoms. Detection of a gene mutation may indicate that the
individual will eventually get the disease, or that the individual is at
heightened risk for developing the disease.
Pharmacogenetic testing aims to identify genetic variations that will predict
an individual's response to drug therapy. This technology is in its infancy,
with only a few tests developed for this purpose.4 8 The goal is to eventually
develop many tests that will determine whether an individual will respond
positively or suffer adverse drug reactions from a particular drug and its
dosage, and ultimately to prescribe the safest and most effective drug to each
individual.49
E. How Genetic Tests Are Different From or Similar to Other Medical
Tests and Procedures
Some of the concerns raised by the marketing of genetic tests to consumers
mirror concerns raised with respect to other DTC marketing efforts, including
those for prescription drugs.50 Genetic testing, however, also differs from
other diagnostic tests and medical treatments. First, when conducted for a
person not experiencing any symptoms of a disease, a genetic test result is
solely predictive, not diagnostic. A positive test result indicates the presence
of a particular gene sequence that is associated with the occurrence of a
particular disease. The presence of the gene sequence by itself does not mean
the person will develop the disease. In other words, the information is
probabilistic and not deterministic. Even in those cases where presence of the
47. JORDE ET AL., supra note 31, at 215-16.
48. Pharmacogenetic testing can be used before symptoms of disease are present and after
symptoms appear and a diagnosis has been made. An example of presymptomatic
pharmacogenetic testing is the OtoDx test, currently offered by Athena Diagnostics, which tests
for the A1555G mutation that has been associated with increased susceptibility to hearing loss
after exposure to a certain class of antibiotics called aminoglycosides. See Athena Diagnostics,
OtoDxAminoglycoside Hypersensitivity Test, at http://www.athenadiagnostics.comhearingloss/
otodxamino.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). An example of post-diagnostic pharmacogenetic
testing is HER2 oncogene testing in breast cancer cells. Medical providers can use the results
of this test to assess a patient's likely response to the medication Herceptin. Because this
medication specifically targets breast cancer cells that contain an alteration in the HER2 gene,
breast cancer cells without this alteration are unaffected. See Genentech, HER2 Disease in
Breast Cancer, at http:/Iwww.gene.com/genelproducts/education/oncology/her2disease.jsp (last
visited Apr. 14, 2004).
49. THOMPSON & THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 252-53.
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gene has a complete correlation with development of a disease, the test cannot
predict when the disease will manifest itself or its duration and severity.5" To
be sure, nongenetic medical tests provide probabilistic information as well,
but the data from these tests are usually not the only clinical information used
to make significant, potentially life-altering decisions, such as the termination
of pregnancy or prophylactic mastectomy.52
Genetic tests also may have implications for other family members. If a
child is a carrier, it necessarily means at least one parent is also a carrier. If
the child carries two copies of a recessive gene, both parents are carriers.
Other siblings may also be carriers or may develop the disease; likewise for
the children of the tested individual. Individuals who choose to obtain genetic
tests, therefore, are more likely to discover genetic information about their
relatives and will face difficult questions about whether to inform these
relatives of test results.53 Health care providers may also face not only ethical,
but also legal questions about the duty to inform relatives of a patient's
genetic information that might have bearing on their health.54
Genetic test results, though not necessarily more informative than other
health information, are often perceived as such in the popular media and
society at large. Genetic information carries with it an aura of immutability
not found with other medical information. While medical conditions are often
treatable, a person's genes are largely unalterable.56 Thus, genetic test results
51. For example, a person who has the mutation causing Huntington disease will always
develop the disease, but the age of onset varies. THOMPSON & THOMPSON, supra note 14, at
240.
52. Women who carry the mutation in the BRCA 1 or 2 gene have a heightened risk of
developing breast and ovarian cancer. Medical providers may recommend prophylactic
mastectomy or oophorectomy or both to reduce the risk of developing disease. Id. at 394.
53. John Balint, Issues of Privacy and Confidentiality in the New Genetics, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI.
& TECH. 27, 34-35 (1998).
54. Jeffrey W. Burnett, A Physician's Duty to Warn a Patient's Relatives of a Patient's
Genetically Inheritable Disease, 36 HouS. L. REV. 559, 575-80 (1999); Janet L. Dolgin,
Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 802-16
(2000/2001).
55. Ellen Wright Clayton, Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Genomic Medicine,
349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 562, 563 (2003).
56. Since the 1970s, scientists have endeavored to demonstrate that "gene therapy" is a
viable therapeutic approach to alleviating many genetic disorders. Gene therapy, also called
gene transfer, is an investigational technique that involves the transfer of a small segment of
DNA into an individual's cells and the expression of that DNA in the body. THOMPSON &
THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 269-70. The goal - largely unrealized to date - is to overcome
the effects of an individual's incorrectly functioning genes through the introduction of
additional genes. Such genes may correct the defect in a variety of ways, including "replacing"
the nonfunctioning gene with a functioning one, or causing cells containing deleterious genes,
such as those that cause cancer, to self-destruct. See, e.g., Alan Fischer et al., Gene Therapy of
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inform individuals, or at least are perceived as informing individuals, about
their destiny in a way that other medical information does not.57
Consequently, the information carries a certain power, and a potential stigma,
that has led to concerns that it will be used to a person's disadvantage, for
example, in insurance and employment.58
III. Concerns That Have Been Raised Regarding Direct Access Testing and
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Genetic Tests
A. The Current Market
Like most laboratory tests, most genetic tests are currently unavailable
without the intervention of a health care provider.59 The major laboratories
generally sell their testing services to health care providers and hospitals and
not directly to consumers. According to one source, only ten to fifteen percent
of hospital and commercial laboratories offer DTC testing, but this estimate
does not distinguish between genetic and nongenetic tests. 60 Laboratories that
sell testing services directly to consumers have largely used the Internet to
promote awareness and generate demand. A 2003 study that surveyed the
Internet found 105 websites that offer genetic services directly to the public.6'
Health-related genetic testing services are offered through fourteen of these
62sites.
Severe Combined Immunodeficiencies, 2 NATURE REVIEWS IMMUNOLOGY 615 (2002); Frank
McCormick, Cancer Gene Therapy: Fringe or Cutting Edge?, 1 NATURE REVIEWS CANCER
130 (2001). Researchers have encountered many difficulties along the path to the clinical use
of gene therapy. In particular, gene delivery issues, such as how to transfer the segment of DNA
into target cells in a manner that allows integration or gene expression without disrupting other
processes, have continued to pose challenges. See, e.g., Gene Therapy: Shining Hopes
Dented - But Not Dashed, 420 NATURE 735 (2002); Erika Check, Gene Therapy: A Tragic
Setback, 420 NATURE 116 (2002).
57. Clayton, supra note 55, at 563.
58. Dolgin, supra note 54, at 764-65.
59. An increasing number of states permit consumers to obtain testing directly from a
laboratory without a health care professional's involvement. Direct access testing, however,
tends to be limited to those tests that are considered simple to perform, such as cholesterol
testing. See Matthew Schulze, Am. Soc'y for Clinical Pathology (ASCP), 25 Percent More
StatesAllow DirectAccess Testing, 32 LABORATORYMED. 661 (2001), athttp:llwww.ascp.orgl
general/media/1000422.pdf.
60. Toby L. Merlin, Direct Access Testing, presentation at CLIAC Meeting (Mar. 2003)
(on file with authors); Laurie Tarkan, Blood-Test Labs Bypass Doctors, Spurring Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at F6 (quoting Jondavid Klipp, managing editor of Laboratory Industrial
Report, a trade publication).




DIRECT- TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTS
The types of services offered directly to consumers range from
"mainstream" genetic tests, or those generally accepted and used as part of
patient care, to those that do not have a history of clinical use or the usual
indicia of scientific support. Those in the "mainstream" category include tests
for cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell anemia, and other blood disorders.63 Tests in the
latter category include tests that (1) offer "genetic profiling" to recommend
nutritional supplements tailored to an individual's genetic makeup;' (2) claim
to identify persons with increased tendencies toward addictive behavior and
offer nutritional supplements to counteract this tendency;65 and (3) offer
personal skin care regimens tailored to DNA type.66
Laboratories that do not sell directly to consumers also generally do not
advertise in consumer-oriented media. A notable exception is Myriad
Genetics, a company that has undertaken a DTC promotion campaign for the
BRCA genetic test. In September 2002, Myriad launched a five-month,
"BRACAnalysis - Be Ready Against Cancer" campaign to help educate
women and their physicians about hereditary breast cancer, genetic testing,
and ways to reduce cancer risk.67 This pilot program, which ran in two cities,
used television, print, and radio "to alert women with a family history of
63. Health Check USA provides DNA testing for cystic fibrosis and inherited disorders of
blood clotting. See HEALTHCHECKUSA, at http://www.healthcheckusa.com (2002). Pediatrix
offers both newborn screening and carrier screening for many genetic conditions including
cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell anemia, and galactosemia. See PEDIATRIX SCREENING, at
http://www.pediatrixscreening.com (2003). Alpha-1 Foundation and the University of South
Carolina offer genetic testing for alpha-I antitrypsin deficiency. See ALPHA-1 FOUNDATION, at
http://www.alphaone.org (last visited July 17, 2004).
64. GeneLink and its partner company, NuGenix, offer both genetic testing services and
recommendations for dietary supplements based on test results. These corporations and their
distributors, such as Custom Nutrition, promote the use of genetic technologies for "genetic
profiling." See CUSTOM NUTRITION, at http://www.custom-nutrition.com/index.html (2004);
GENE LINK, at http://www.bankdna.com (last visited Apr. 17,2004); NUGENIX, athttp://www.
nugenix.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2004).
65. Doc Blum Inc. offers genetic testing services that identify persons with increased
tendencies toward addictive behaviors and offers the RDSystem of supplements to counteract
the "Reward Deficiency Syndrome." See Doc BLUM INC., at http://www.docbluminc.com (last
visited Apr. 17, 2004).
66. Lab2l offers personal skin care regimes that are tailored to a customer's genetic test
results. Their product, DNA Face Cream, is advertised as "the ultimate anti-aging skincare
product customized based on results of a genetic test and answers to a skin questionnaire." See
LAB21, at http://www.lab2l.com/web/ordering.php?a=internet (last visited Apr. 17, 2004).
67. Adam Marcus, First Ad Campaign Touts Genetic Screening for Cancer, HEALTH ON
THE NET FOUND. (Sept. 23, 2003), at http://www.hon.ch/News/HSN/509235.html; Helen
Pearson, Genetic Test Adverts Under Scrutiny, NATURE SCI. UPDATE (Mar. 19, 2003), at
http://www.nature.com/nsu/030317/030317-3.html.
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cancer to recent advances in cancer prevention and early disease detection."68
The advertising campaign did not offer or encourage testing directly to the
consumer, but instead encouraged consumers to consult their physician about
this genetic test.69 Another exception is Genovations, which promotes the use
of single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) testing 70 to make nutritional and
lifestyle recommendations, and suggests that these tests are relevant to
patients "with chronic conditions who have been refractory to traditionally
effective treatment," those "with a 'family history' of chronic illnesses like
heart disease, osteoporosis, chronic fatigue, or inflammatory disorders," and
those who are looking for "more precise, proactive health risk screening.",
71
The company markets these tests through a network of physicians and health
care providers. Genovations does not allow consumers to directly order their
testing, but instead refers them to a physician who orders the tests for them.
72
Finally, Seryx Signature Genetics also markets genetic testing for information
on medication, nutrition and lifestyle directly to consumers, but requires a
physician to order tests and receive results.73
B. Criticisms of Direct-to-Consumer and Direct Access Marketing
Criticisms have been leveled against both the sale of genetic testing
services and the advertising of these services to consumers. Critics, however,
68. Myriad, Myriad Genetics Launches Direct to Consumer Advertising Campaign for
Breast Cancer Test (Sept. 12, 2002), at http://www.corporate-ir.net/ireye/lirsite.zhtml?ticker=
mygn&script=413&layout=9&itemid=333030.
69. Myriad, BRACAnalysis: BeReadyAgainst Cancer, athttp://www.bracnow.com(2002).
70. Single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) are common variations in a single base of a
human DNA sequence that occur in approximately every one thousand bases. SNPs may be
useful for two purposes: (1) they may be used as markers where they are in close proximity on
a chromosome to a deleterious mutation, or (2) they may be used to analyze shifts in SNPs in
certain groups of people and thereby trace the connection of widely dispersed ethnic groups and
races. By studying SNP profiles that are associated with specific disease traits, scientists hope
to better understand multigene disorders and enable physicians to screen individuals for
susceptibility to a disease. NAT'LHUMAN GENOME RES. INST., TALKING GLOSSARY OFGENETIC
TERMS, at http://www.genome.gov/glossary.cfm?key=single%20nucleotide%20polymorphisms
%20%28SNPs%29 (last visited Apr. 17, 2004); PERKINELMER, SNP AND GENOTYPING
OVERVIEW, at http://las.perkinelmer.com/content/snps/genotyping.asp (2004); SNP CONSOR-
TIUM, LTD., SINGLE NUCLEOTIDE POLYMORPHISM: AN INTRODUCTION, at http://snp.cshl.org/
about/introduction.shtml (last updated Apr. 30, 2002).
71. GENOVATIONS, PHYSICiANs GUIDETO CLINICALGENOMICS, at http:/Iwww. genovations.
com/clinicianoverview.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2004).
72. GENOVATIONS, FREQUENT QUESTIONS ABOUT GENOVATIONS TESTING, at http://www.
genovations.comGenovationsFrequentQuestions.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2004).
73. SERYX SIGNATURE GENETICS, How SIGNATURE GENETICS WORKS, at http://www.




tend not to clearly distinguish between sale and advertising. With respect to
direct sale, critics argue that the assistance of a health care provider is
necessary to explain the context and consequences of testing.74 With respect
to advertising, critics contend that the advertisements that currently exist
"downplay the uncertainties of genetic testing, obscure the phenotypic
variability expected with positive results,... distort disease risk information
for the consumer ... [and] draw on hyperbole to describe the utility of their
genetic tests.... ."' Furthermore, some argue that mass media advertisements
create an exaggerated message about disease risk and thereby increase
consumer anxiety.76 Advertisers "capitalize on the hope and fear that genetics
evokes to sell their products and perpetuate a deterministic conception of
genetics, thereby exacerbating consumers' distorted beliefs."77 Advertisements
can invoke images in consumers' minds of the most severe clinical
presentation of a disease, leading to increased demand for, and overuse, of
genetic testing by consumers.78 Some argue that advertisements can also
stigmatize an entire ethnic group if they associate that group with an increased
risk for a genetic disease.79
While critics concede that advertising has the potential to benefit the public
through education," they conclude that these benefits are limited by (1) the
difficulty consumers may have in comprehending complex genetics
information and the potential that they will misunderstand test results, (2) the
lack of sufficient information for pretest decision-making, and (3) the
availability of genetic tests without scientific consensus on their clinical
validity or utility."'
With regard to problems of comprehension, critics contend that genetic
information is difficult to understand because test results provide only
probabilities of risk. 2 Whether a person who tests positive will manifest the
disease, and how severe the disease will be, cannot be predicted from the
test. 3 Explaining these subtleties is difficult to accomplish in an
74. Hull & Prasad, supra note 8, at 34; Williams-Jones, supra note 8, at 54.
75. Gollust et al., Limitations, supra note 8, at 1764.
76. Id.; Hull & Prasad, supra note 8, at 34.
77. Gollust et al., Limitations, supra note 8, at 1766.
78. Williams-Jones, supra note 8, at 48.
79. Gollust et al., Limitations, supra note 8, at 1764.
80. Williams-Jones, supra note 8, at 48.
81. Gollust et al., Limitations, supra note 8, at 1763; Gollust et al., Sales, supra note 8, at
334.
82. Clayton, supra note 55, at 563.
83. Id. A positive test result detecting a mutation does not always indicate that an
individual will develop symptoms of the disease. Differing phenotypic expressions of an
abnormal genotype can occur because of, among other reasons, reduced penetrance (where some
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advertisement.84 Consequently, consumers may be at increased risk for
-misunderstanding the meaning or implications of test results that are provided
directly to them. 5  Currently, only a limited number of websites offer
physician consultations or genetic counseling services.86 A few companies
require that test results be sent directly to the consumer's health care
practitioner. However, given the varying degree of knowledge that providers
have regarding genetics, it is unclear how much assistance they can provide
patients in interpreting test results.87
Of additional concern to critics is that websites often provide insufficient
information for consumers to make informed pretest decisions.88 They argue
that websites often exaggerate the benefits and limit the disclosure of risks
commonly associated with genetic testing.89 These risks include concerns
about privacy, implications to family members, and protection of the DNA
sample - its storage, withdrawal, and possible future use.9 ° Although privacy
concerns apply to the purchase of any product over the Internet, genetic testing
services involve the disclosure of personal health information, and such
information could be misused by the companies that obtain it, or by those who
obtain unauthorized access to the website. 91
Finally, critics assert that advertisements for genetic tests that have no
proven clinical validity have the potential to mislead consumers into believing
that a test has proven benefits.92 Critics are particularly concerned about the
widespread use of the Internet to promote and sell genetic tests. Unlike
individuals who have the genotype completely fail to express it) and variable expression (where
severity of disease differs in people who have the same genotype). THOMPSON & THOMPSON,
supra note 14, at 62.
84. Gollust et al., Limitations, supra note 8, at 1763.
85. Bryn Williams-Jones, Re-Framing the Discussion: Commercial Genetic Testing in
Canada, 7 HEALTH L.J. 49, 60-61 (1999).
86. See, e.g., DATAGENE, at http://www. datagene.com/about.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2004) (providing genetic counseling services); KIMBALLGENETICS, at http://www.kimballgen
etics.com/about.html (last updated Sept. 2003) (same); see also ALPHA-1 FOUNDATION, at
http://www.alphaone.org (last visited July 17, 2004) (providing physician consultations or
requiring physician participation); GENOVATIONS, at http://www.genovations.com/index.htmil
(2002) (same); MYRIAD, at http://www.myriadtests.com/testp.htm (2002) (same).
87. Jon Emery et al., A Systematic Review of the Literature Exploring the Role of Primary
Care in Genetic Services, 16 FAM. PRAC. 426 (1999); KJ Hofman et al., Physicians' Knowledge
of Genetics and Genetic Tests, 68 ACAD. MED. 625 (1993).
88. Gollust et al., Sales, supra note 8, at 334-36.
89. Id. at 336.
90. Id.; see also Clayton, supra note 55, at 566-67.
91. Williams-Jones, supra note 8, at 51.
92. Gollust et al., Limitations, supra note 8, at 1764; Gollust et al., Sales, supra note 8, at
[Vol. 57:25 1
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DIRECT- TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTS
television commercials, which are subject to review by the networks, anyone
can establish an Internet presence for relatively little money and without any
external scrutiny, thereby reaching millions of potential customers. It may be
particularly difficult for a nongenetics expert to discern the veracity of claims
made and information provided on such genetic testing websites.93 Following
certain test results, consumers may be persuaded to alter their behavior by
changing their diet or medications. They may also pursue genetic testing
instead of other appropriate treatment.
As a result of these concerns, some critics conclude that "health-related
genetic testing should not be routinely available on the Internet for consumers
to order or receive results without the involvement of an appropriate health
care practitioner" in the absence of data demonstrating that consumers are not
harmed by direct access testing.94 Further, they assert that, "only once the
public has a more sophisticated appreciation of genetics can advertisements
appropriately promote genetic testing options directly to consumers."95
IV. Regulation of Genetic Tests In the United States
Criticisms of DTC marketing comprise a critique of both sale and
advertising.96 This part discusses what various federal government entities
currently do with respect to both of these components of marketing, and the
role that states play with respect to genetic test regulation.
93. Williams-Jones, supra note 8, at 48.
94. Gollust et al., Sales, supra note 8, at 336. International advisory commissions have
made similar proposals. For example, the United Kingdom's Human Genetics Commission
(HGC) recommended that most genetic tests providing predictive health information should not
be offered directly to consumers. Analogizing to prescription medication, HGC concluded that
the presumption should be that genetic tests that are predictive of medical conditions are
unsuitable for DTC access through a nonmedical health professional or other intermediary. In
Australia, the government advisory commission recommended greater regulation of health-
related genetic tests provided direct-to-consumers, though the commission recognized the
difficulty in regulating the supply and advertising of genetic testing products provided over the
Internet by foreign companies. ALRC & AHEC, ESSENTIALLY YOURS, supra note 6. In the
United States, the Task Force on Genetic Testing issued a report in 1997 advising consumers
to discuss testing options with a health care provider trained in genetics before undergoing
genetic testing, and discouraged advertising or marketing of predictive genetic tests to the
public. TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE GENETIC TESTING
IN THE UNITED STATES: FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING 56 (Neil A.
Holtzman & Michael S. Watson eds., Sept. 1997), available at http://www.genome.gov/
10001733.
95. Gollust et al., Limitations, supra note 8, at 1764; see also supra note 94.
96. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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A. Federal
Whereas the regulatory oversight of FDA and CMS relates to the sale of
products and services respectively, including development, testing,
production, and distribution, the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) oversight
pertains to advertising of commercial products and services.
Whether and to what extent genetic tests may be subject to regulation by
the federal government depends on how they are classified. To the extent
genetic testing is considered a commercial service provided through clinical
laboratories, similar to blood or other metabolic tests undertaken by these
entities, it is subject to regulation by CMS, which administers the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA 88). 97 On the other
hand, to the extent that a genetic test is construed as a freestanding "product"
intended for use in the diagnosis of a disease or medical condition, it is subject
to regulation as a medical device under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FD&C Act),9 8 which is administered by the FDA. The ambiguity about
the legal status of genetic testing, as well as arguably underzealous exercise
of available authority by CMS, has led to insufficient oversight of genetic
testing.
1. CLIA 88
CLIA 88 amended the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act of 1967. 99
It was intended to "strengthen federal oversight of clinical laboratories to
assure that the tests results are accurate and reliable.' Congress found that
laboratory testing played a critical role in the delivery of health services and
maintaining good health, and that patients both expect and assume that such
testing is done properly.'0 ' Congressional investigations, however, found
significant problems in the quality of testing services being provided to the
public. Many laboratories were not subject to the federal regulations then in
place, and many of those laboratories that were subject to the law were not
complying with its requirements. The major problems identified by Congress
were "lax [flederal oversight and direction, lack of proficiency testing for
many analytes, inconsistent criteria for acceptable laboratory performance,
and improprieties by laboratories in handling specimen samples."'0 2
Deficiencies were particularly apparent in cytological screening of pap smears
97. 42 U.S.C. § 263(a)-(q) (2000).
98. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000).
99. Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-174, § 5(a), 81 Stat.
533, 536.
100. H.R. REP. No. 100-899, at 8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3828, 3829.
101. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3831.




for cervical cancer. Congress determined that many laboratories were
reporting false negative results. In other words, women with abnormal, and
possibly cancerous, cells were being incorrectly informed that their pap
smears were normal. 1
03
In enacting CLIA 88, Congress directed the Secretary of HHS to issue
standards for the certification of laboratories "to assure that such laboratories
will consistently perform tests in a valid and reliable manner.' The
Secretary delegated authority to develop and enforce these standards to what
is now CMS. 1°5
CLIA 88 defines a "clinical laboratory" as:
[A] facility for the biological, microbiological, serological,
chemical, immuno-hematological, hematological, biophysical,
cytological, pathological, or other examination of materials derived
from the human body for the purpose of providing information for
the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or
impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human beings."
The statute prohibits the solicitation or acceptance of "materials derived
from the human body for laboratory examination or other procedure" unless
CMS or a CMS-authorized entity issues the laboratory a certificate.0 7
Certified laboratories must comply with standards issued by CMS, to the
extent that such standards apply to the type of testing being performed.'0 8 In
103. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3838.
104. Id. at 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3848. Congress directed that the standards
address: (1) maintenance of a quality assurance and quality control program by the laboratory;
(2) maintenance of appropriate records; (3) equipment and facilities; (4) personnel standards;
and (5) proficiency testing. It also added authority for the development of standards that the
Secretary determined were "necessary to protect the health and safety of patients." Id.
105. Some of the responsibilities for implementing the statute were assumed by FDA and
CDC. See, e.g., CLIA Program; Transfer of Clinical Laboratory Complexity Categorization
Responsibility, 64 Fed. Reg. 73,561 (Dec. 30, 1999); Centers for Disease Control; Statement
of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,768 (Mar. 30, 1992);
Centers for Disease Control; Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of
Authority, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,537 (June 1, 1989).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2000).
107. Id. § 263a(b). Obtaining a certificate requires submitting an application describing the
number and type of tests to be performed by the laboratory. One of several different certificates
may be issued, depending on the type of testing to be performed. Before receiving a certificate,
the laboratory must be inspected, either by CLIA personnel or by an approved third-party
accrediting body, such as the College of American Pathologists. Accreditation by an approved
third party is sufficient to obtain a certificate. Id. § 263a(d)-(e); see also CLIA, LIST OF
APPROVED ACCREDITING ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE CLNICAL LABORATORY IMPROVEMENT
AMENDMENTS, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/clia/accrdorg.asp (last updated May 21, 2003).
108. CMS is charged with issuing "standards to assure consistent performance ... of valid
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particular, if the agency has established "proficiency testing standards" for a
particular type of test, the laboratory must comply with those standards.' 09
There is no dispute that laboratories that conduct genetic testing to aid in
the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of disease or in assessing human health
are subject to CLIA 88. What these laboratories must do in practical terms to
assure quality testing, however, and whether current requirements are
sufficient to do so, is less certain. Currently, with the exception of
cytogenetics, CMS has not mandated proficiency standards for genetic
testing. "0 From 1997 to 2000, the Clinical Laboratories Improvement
Advisory Committee (CLIAC), within CDC, debated the need for proficiency
testing standards for genetic testing. "' Since 2000, CDC has been working to
develop such standards. Although a Notice of Intent to issue a proposed
regulation was published in 2000,' 12 no proposed rule has been issued, nor is
one expected in the near term.' Thus, laboratories must figure out how to
and reliable laboratory examinations and other procedures." 42 U.S.C. § 263a(f)(1). These
standards "shall require each laboratory issued a certificate" to: (1) "maintain a quality
assurance and quality control program adequate and appropriate for the validity and reliability
of the laboratory examinations and other procedures of the laboratory and to meet requirements
relating to the proper collection, transportation, and storage of specimens and reporting of
results"; (2) "maintain records, equipment, and facilities necessary for the proper and effective
operation of the laboratory"; (3) use only personnel meeting the qualifications established by
CMS; (4) "qualify under a proficiency testing program meeting the standards established by"
CMS; and (5) "meet such other requirements" that CMS determines "necessary to assure
consistent performance by such laboratories of accurate and reliable laboratory examinations
and procedures." Id. The statute directs the agency, in developing such standards, to take into
account, among other factors: (1) "the examinations and procedures performed and the
methodologies employed"; (2) "the degree of independentjudgment involved"; (3) "the amount
of interpretation involved"; (4) "the difficulty of the calculations involved"; (5) "the calibration
and quality control requirements of the instruments used"; and (6) "the type of training required
to operate the instruments used in the methodology." Id. § 263a(f)(2).
109. Proficiency testing is "a method of externally validating the level of a laboratory's
performance." H.R. REP. No. 100-899, at 15 (1988), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3828,
3836. According to the statute, proficiency testing standards "shall require" the laboratory to
"be tested for each examination and procedure conducted within a category of examinations or
procedures for which it has received a certificate" unless CMS has determined that a proficiency
test "cannot reasonably be developed" for a particular test or procedure. 42 U.S.C. §
263a(f)(3)(A).
110. 42 C.F.R. § 493.1267 (2003).
111. CLINICAL LAB. IMPROVEMENT ADVISORY COMM. (CLIAC), SUMMARY REPORT, Sept.
1997, SUMMARYREPORT, Jan. 1998, SUMMARY REPORT, Apr. 2000, SUMMARY REPORT, Sept.
2000, at http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/cliac/default.asp.
112. Notice of Intent; Genetic Testing Under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments, 65 Fed. Reg. 25,928 (May 4, 2000).





comply with the statutory requirement for proficiency testing without
guidance from the government.
CLIA does not regulate what tests a laboratory may offer - typically the
laboratory director determines whether to offer a particular test to the public.
In addition, neither CLIA 88 nor standards issued by voluntary accrediting
organizations address advertising. Specifically, there are no regulations or
guidelines concerning what laboratories may say in communications aimed at
promoting genetic tests. Nor do the regulations impose any particular
obligation on laboratories to communicate or explain to patients the meaning
of test results or the limitations of specific tests." 4 While the majority of
clinical laboratories market their services primarily, if not exclusively, to
physicians and health care institutions, there is no federal prohibition on
marketing genetic tests directly to consumers. Further, there are no regulatory
provisions that limit the claims that may be brought for the tests.
2. FDA
The FD&C Act authorizes FDA regulation of drugs and medical devices,
among other products." 5 The statute provides FDA the authority to require
manufacturers of these products to submit data demonstrating that the
products are safe and effective before they may be sold to consumers. "6 FDA
also has the authority to approve the claims of benefit that manufacturers may
make regarding these products, and to determine the conditions under which
they may be sold, such as by prescription only.' 17
The statute defines a medical device as an "article" that is intended for use
in the "diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease"' 8 or that is "intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body,"" 9 but that "does not achieve its primary
intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man...
and.., is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its
primary intended purposes."'
12 0
Diagnostic test kits, such as those used to diagnose human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or detect pregnancy, are regulated by FDA as
114. State laws vary about who may order and receive the results of laboratory tests.
Schulze, supra note 59.
115. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000).
116. Id. §§ 355(b)(1), 360e(c).
117. Id. § 353(b).
118. Id. § 321(h)(2).
119. Id. § 321(h)(3).
120. Id.
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in vitro diagnostic devices (IVDs).' 2' Like other medical devices, IVDs are
subject to premarket approval or clearance requirements. 122  FDA has
published specific regulations applicable to in vitro diagnostic devices. 23
Most genetic tests, however, are not marketed as freestanding products, but
are developed in-house by laboratories and marketed as clinical laboratory
services. These tests are referred to as in-house tests or "home brew"
assays. 24 In the past, FDA has asserted regulatory jurisdiction over home
brew assays, but, with one exception, has elected not to exercise that authority
as a matter of enforcement discretion. 25 In 1997, FDA issued a regulation
121. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 809 (2003).
122. A device that has not previously been marketed in the United States must file a
premarket approval application (PMA). The PMA must contain data from clinical trials
demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of the device. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(f)(1), 360e(c)(1).
If the device is "substantially equivalent" to a device in commercial distribution in the United
States before May 28, 1976, however, a PMA is not required. 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(a)(1).
Instead, the manufacturer must submit a premarket notification, termed a "510(k)" submission.
21 U.S.C. § 3600)-(k); 21 C.F.R. § 807.81. Premarket notification is significantly faster and
less expensive and is used for the majority of devices currently on the market. See Howard M.
Holstein & Edward C. Wilson, Developments in Medical Device Regulation, in 2
FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION 275-77 (Robert P. Brady et al., eds., 1997);
Benjamin A. Goldberger, The Evolution of Substantial Equivalence in FDA's PremarketReview
of Medical Devices, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 317 (2001).
123. 21 C.F.R. pt. 809. IVDs are defined as "those reagents, instruments, and systems
intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, including a determination of the
state of health, in order to cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease or its sequelae. Such products
are intended for use in the collection, preparation, and examination of specimens taken from the
human body." 21 C.F.R. § 809.3(a).
124. See Medical Devices; Classification/Reclassification; Restricted Devices; Analyte
Specific Reagents, 61 Fed. Reg. 10,484 (Mar. 14, 1996); Jeffrey K. Shapiro & Randy J. Prebula,
FDA's Regulation of Analyte-Specific Reagents, at http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/
03/02/018.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
125. In the preamble to the proposed rule classifying analyte specific reagents, FDA stated:
[I]n-house developed tests have not been actively regulated by the Agency and the
ingredients used in them generally are not produced under FDA assured
manufacturing quality control. Other general controls also have not been applied
routinely to these products. FDA is not proposing a comprehensive regulatory
scheme over the final tests produced by these laboratories and is focusing instead
on the "active ingredients" (ASR's) provided to the laboratories. However, at a
future date, the agency may reevaluate whether additional controls over the in-
house tests developed by such laboratories may be needed to provide an
appropriate level of consumer protection. Such controls may be especially relevant
as testing for the presence of genes associated with cancer or dementing diseases
becomes more widely available. Additional controls might include a broad array
of approaches, ranging from full premarket review by FDA to use of third parties
to evaluate analytical or clinical performance of the tests. The laboratories




classifying "analyte specific reagents" (ASRs) as medical devices.' 26 ASRs
are reagents used by clinical laboratories in developing home brew assays and
can be considered the "active ingredients" of such tests.'27 Most ASRs,
including those used in genetic tests, are not subject to premarket approval
requirements, but must comply with "general controls," such as labeling and
good manufacturing practices (GMP) requirements. 128  In addition,
laboratories must be certified to perform high complexity testing to purchase
ASRs. 2 9
Finally, with the exception of ASRs, FDA does not regulate - nor does it
have clearjurisdiction at this time to regulate -communications made by the
laboratories providing genetic tests, or the manner in which such tests are sold
or provided to patients. The consequence is that, notwithstanding some
involvement by FDA and CMS, little federal regulatory oversight of genetic
tests exists in the United States. More specifically, there is no governmental
review of whether tests work or the claims made for them are accurate.
B. States
Under the U.S. federalist system of government, the federal government is
one of enumerated powers.'- ° Thus, states may regulate in all areas not
specifically preempted by Congress, subject to the constraints of the U.S.
Constitution. States generally have primary authority to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of their citizens.''
For the most part, state agencies implement the CLIA program but do not
currently regulated by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) under
the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA-88) for
compliance with general laboratory standards regarding personnel, proficiency
testing, quality control, and quality assurance. However, these HCFA regulations
do not include the same product controls provided by FDA. As a result, neither
patients nor practitioners have assurance that all ingredients in the laboratory
developed tests are of high quality and capable of producing consistent results.
Medical Devices; Classification/Reclassification; Restricted Devices; Analyte Specific
Reagents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 10,484.
126. Medical Devices; Classification/Reclassification; Restricted Devices; Analyte Specific
Reagents, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,243 (Nov. 21, 1997) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 809, 864 (1997)).
127. Id.
128. 21 C.F.R. §§ 809.10, 809.30, 864.4020(b)(1) (2003).
129. Id. § 809.30(b)(2).
130. The powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal
government are specified in Articles I, II, and II of the U.S. Constitution. The Tenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that the "powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or
to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
131. Gostin, supra note 10, at 47-51.
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add to it. Though some states have enacted more stringent requirements, 3 2
these requirements fail to address advertising by laboratories or
communications between laboratories and those seeking testing.
To varying degrees, states also regulate who may order a genetic test from
a laboratory. Some states specifically permit enumerated tests, such as
cholesterol or pregnancy tests, to be ordered by patients without a prescription
from a health care provider.'33 Some states categorically prohibit direct access
testing.'34 Still other state laws are silent on the issue, which leaves the
question of whether to offer direct access testing up to individual
laboratories. "
V. Regulation of Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertisements by
the FDA and FTC
Some critics recommend that either the FDA or the FTC regulate
advertising for genetic testing in a manner similar to the regulation of DTC
pharmaceutical advertising."' This suggestion is problematic in several
respects. First, FDA's jurisdiction to regulate genetic tests is not obvious.
Second, FDA's attempt to restrict consumer-directed information of products
that it unquestionably regulates has drawn sharp criticism from both the U.S.
Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, rendering
the agency's burden for demonstrating the need for speech-restrictive
regulation much greater. While the FTC's governing statute would in some
respects provide greater jurisdictional flexibility, the agency needs to be
132. For example, New York has received a waiver from CLIA 88 because its clinical
laboratory certification program exceeds the federal minimum standards. See LABORATORY
QUALITY CERTIFICATION: CLINICAL EVALUATION PROGRAM, at http://www.wadsworth.orgl
labcert/clep/clep.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
133. Schulze, supra note 59. For example, California and Maine allow direct access testing
for certain specified tests. The following thirty-four jurisdictions permit direct access testing of
some kind: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
134. Id. The following eighteen states prohibit direct access testing: Alabama, Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
Id.
135. See id. Most states that permit direct access testing do so because their laws do not
prohibit or otherwise provide guidance on the issue of whether patients may order laboratory
tests without a medical order. Id.




cognizant of First Amendment constraints, as well as its own resource
limitations, in undertaking any regulatory initiatives to constrain DTC testing.
With these caveats in mind, however, it is nevertheless useful to review the
history of these agencies' regulation of DTC pharmaceutical advertising, and
to determine whether and to what extent lessons can be drawn from this
experience in determining appropriate regulations for DTC genetic testing
advertising.
A. FDA Regulation of DTC Prescription Drug Advertising
FDA' s current regulatory regime permits prescription drug manufacturers
that have been approved by the agency to advertise directly to consumers,
subject to a few constraints. In addition, the actual purchase of the
prescription drugs must be mediated through a prescription from a health care
provider.'37 This section provides an overview of FDA's regulation of DTC
promotion of prescription drugs.
FDA regulates all labeling 38 and advertising'39 of prescription drugs.
Section 502(n) of the FD&C Act, added to the statute in 1962, provides that
a prescription drug will be deemed "misbranded" and subject to enforcement
137. The FD&C Act provides that a drug may be dispensed only upon the prescription of a
licensed practitioner if it is not safe to use except under practitioner supervision or if it is
required under the terms of the approval. 21 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2000). State laws vary
regarding which health care providers are authorized to prescribe drugs. See, e.g., Mary Beck,
Improving America's Health Care: Authorizing Independent Prescriptive Privileges for
Advanced Practice Nurses, 29 U.S.F.L. REV. 951 (1995); Elizabeth Harrison Hadley, Nurses
and Prescriptive Authority: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 245 (1989);
James L.J. Nuzzo, Independent Prescribing Authority of Advanced Practice Nurses: A Threat
to the Public Health?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 35 (1998).
138. The FD&C Act defines labeling as "all labels and other written, printed, or graphic
matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such
article." 21 U.S.C. § 321(m). The range of material that FDA regulates as labeling is quite
broad. In Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948), the Supreme Court held that labeling
"is not restricted to labels that are on or in the article or package that is transported," but that,
information might accompany a product, and hence qualify as labeling, as long as "it
supplements or explains [the product] .... No physical attachment one to the other is necessary.
It is the textual relationship that is significant." Id. at 349-50.
139. Advertising subject to FDA oversight includes "advertisements in published journals,
magazines, other periodicals, and newspapers, and advertisements broadcast through media such
as radio, television, and telephone communication systems." Prescription Drug
Advertistements, 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(1) (2003).
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action14 if it is not advertised in accordance with requirements enumerated in
the statute.
141
FDA regulations require, among other provisions, that an advertisement
include a "true statement of information in brief summary relating to side
effects, contraindications, and effectiveness. "142 The "brief summary"
requirement is generally fulfilled, at least in the print context, by including all
or most of the information contained in the package insert - a lengthy,
complicated, and consumer-unfriendly document. 143
The regulations state that the "true statement" provision applies to the"entire advertisement" and that "[u]ntrue or misleading information in any
part of the advertisement will not be corrected" by true information in a
different part of the advertisement.'" The regulations also list several
instances in which an advertisement would not meet the "true statement"
requirement, including if it "fails to present a fair balance between" risks and
benefits or "fails to reveal facts material in the light of its representations or
material with respect to consequences that may result from the use of the drug
as recommended or suggested in the advertisement."'' 45
140. Penalties for misbranding may include fines or imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 333.
Incorrect labeling is also a form of misbranding, id. § 352(a), for which penalties of a fine or
imprisonment may also apply, id. § 333.
141. The statute requires that the advertisement include the established name of the product,
a list of ingredients, and "information in brief summary relating to side effects,
contraindications, and effectiveness .... " Id. § 352(n).
142. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e). FDA recognizes three categories of advertisements, only one of
which is subject to the brief summary requirement.
Reminder advertisements call attention to the name of the drug product, but do not
include specifications of the drug product. An example of this would be a
ballpoint pen imprinted with a drug brand name. Help-seeking or "see your
doctor" ads typically describe the symptoms of a disease or condition, and
encourage consumers to consult their physician to discuss treatment options, but
do not mention the drug's name. Reminder advertisements and help-seeking
advertisements are exempt from the brief summary and fair balance requirements
because they do not reveal information about the effectiveness of a drug. Product-
claim advertisements reveal the drug's name and indication, and thus must satisfy
the brief summary requirements and maintain fair balance.
Francis B. Palumbo, The Development of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising
Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 423, 428-29 (2002).
143. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e)(4),(5); Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs
to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 148-49
(1997).
144. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(3).




The statute prohibits FDA from requiring preapproval of advertisements, 1
46
but the regulations require that advertisements be submitted at the time of
publication.147 FDA will also review advertising materials before they are
launched upon the manufacturer's request.
1 48
Historically, prescription drug advertising has been directed to
physicians. 49 Until the 1980s, manufacturers did not view DTC advertising
as advantageous15° and preferred to focus marketing efforts on those primarily
responsible for deciding what drugs to prescribe. In 1981, two manufacturers
departed from this long-standing practice; in one case advertising the price of
a specific drug product,' 5' and in the other making specific product claims for
a pneumonia vaccine.' Many manufacturers thereafter sought review of
DTC ads by the agency. In 1983, the FDA Commissioner issued a formal
request to the pharmaceutical industry to voluntarily cease product-specific
DTC advertising,'53 with the exception of advertisements limited to price
comparisons. 5 4 According to the FDA, the two purposes of the moratorium
146. The statute states that "except in extraordinary circumstances, no regulation issued
under this paragraph shall require prior approval by the Secretary of the content of any
advertisement .. " 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)(3)(A).
147. 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(3)(I).
148. Div. OF DRUG MKTG., ADVER. & COMMUNICATIONS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
(FAQS), at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/faqs.htm#dtc (last updated May 28, 2003).
149. Palumbo, supra note 142, at 424.
150. One commentator has noted that "any drug company marketer that suggested a program
of communicating directly with consumers likely would be categorized as suicidal because there
was a fear that doctors would never accept a program that bypassed them." Wayne L. Pines, A
History and Perspective on Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489, 491
(1999).
151. This was a price advertisement by Boots Pharmaceuticals for Rufen, a prescription
ibuprofen product. In 1983, Boots ran a product-claim advertisement for Rufen, which
precipitated a letter from FDA threatening to initiate "regulatory action, such as seizure and
injunction" if the ad was not cancelled. Id. at 500. According to FDA, the ad "failed to provide
brief summary information and also failed to make 'adequate provision' for consumers to obtain
the full package insert." Id. at 499-500. In addition, "[t]he letter called the commercial false
and misleading because it" claimed to be completely interchangeable with a competitor's
product, when, in fact, it was not available in the same dosages. Id. at 500.
152. Id. at 491-92. The product was Pneumovax, manufacturered by Merck, Sharp &
Dohme. FDA was more concerned about the Rufen pricing advertisements than those for
Pneumovax because the agency saw a public health benefit in advertising a vaccine. Id.
153. FDA's request was first made in a speech by the Commissioner to the Pharmaceutical
Advertising Council, which was delivered on February 17, 1983. This was followed by a policy
statement issued on September 2, 1983. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs;
Withdrawal of Moratorium, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,677 (Sept. 9, 1985).
154. Also excluded from the moratorium were company-sponsored ads that discussed
specific diseases but did not mention a particular drug product. Id.
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were to allow time (1) "for a dialogue among consumers, health professionals,
and industry," and (2) "for the conduct and interpretation of research by
interested parties on aspects of consumer-oriented drug advertising."'
' 55
During the moratorium, FDA commissioned studies to gauge consumer
attitudes toward DTC ads and to assess their impact on consumer audiences. 156
FDA lifted the moratorium in 1985 after concluding that the existing statute
and implementing regulations governing prescription drug advertising
provided "sufficient safeguards to protect consumers."' 157 FDA stated that it
would continue to enforce these provisions for all prescription drug
advertising regardless of its intended audience.'58
Consumer-directed advertising increased after FDA lifted the moratorium.
Because of the amount of information that needed to be included to comply
with the "brief summary" requirement, however, the television format was
infeasible. In 1997, FDA issued a "draft guidance" that tailored the
requirements for information disclosure to a broadcast format.'59 Instead of
a brief summary, manufacturers were required to make "adequate provision"
for disseminating the information contained in the brief summary to
consumers. For example, manufacturers could provide a toll-free telephone
number for consumers to call to request that information be sent to them or
direct consumers to a website containing the information. 160 FDA issued a
final guidance in 1999.161 The agency's change in policy opened the
floodgates of DTC television ads and led to the plethora of ads that can
currently be viewed on television. While the majority of all promotional
spending by pharmaceutical companies is still directed toward physicians, 1
62
155. Id.
156. Pines, supra note 150, at 492; Palumbo, supra note 142, at 424 (according to one study,
"consumers retained more information about the benefits of the products than the risks," and,
according to another study, "consumers wanted more information about prescription drugs and
would view DTC advertising favorably").
157. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs; Withdrawal of Moratorium, 50
Fed. Reg. at 36,677.
158. Id.
159. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS,
at http://www.privacysecuritynetwork.com/Library/docs/1804q&a.htm (last updated June 8,
2000). FDA had previously encountered this problem with respect to cable networks directed
at a physician audience and had made exceptions to make electronic advertisements feasible.
FDA has also previously permitted commercial network advertisements that were not product-
specific. Pines, supra note 150, at 494.
160. Pines, supra note 150, at 496-97.
161. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENT
(Aug. 1999), at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/1804fnl.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
162. U.S. GAO, Prescription Drugs: FDA Oversight of Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising Has




spending for DTC advertising is nevertheless substantial. In 2001, it
comprised fourteen percent of all spending on pharmaceutical promotional
activities. 163
The path to DTC television advertising, however, has not been entirely
smooth. In the first year that the new policy was in place, FDA undertook
enforcement action, which consisted of letters to manufacturers warning them
that the advertisements violated the law."M FDA sent these letters to about
half of the ads that appeared, 65 requesting that they be discontinued. These
ads had not been submitted to the agency for review before they were aired.
FDA's predominant concerns regarding DTC ads concerned whether the ads
(1) conveyed risk and benefit information, (2) clearly articulated the intended
patient population and were consistent with the approved indication, and (3)
had adequate support for the ads' claims of superiority over another
product. '66
FDA has issued fewer enforcement letters in recent years. Between 1999
and 2001, for example, FDA issued regulatory letters for only about five
percent of the broadcast advertisements it reviewed.167 This change has been
attributed to both the industry's improved compliance 68 and to FDA's
decreased enforcement efforts. 69 Overall, the agency issued eighty-eight
letters between 1997 and 2002, most of which were for less serious
violations. 7 °  A 2002 GAO report, however, concluded that FDA's
to physicians include not only advertising, but also distribution of samples and visits by sales
representatives to physicians. Id.
163. Id. at 11.
164. DDMAC issues two types of letters to companies to notify them of violations. A Notice
of Violation (NOV) Letter (or "untitled letter") is sent for minor violations, and a Warning
Letter is sent for more serious violations, and indicates that FDA will initiate enforcement
efforts if the manufacturer fails to initiate corrective action. Palumbo, supra note 142, at 429.
165. Id. at 430.
166. Nancy Ostrove, FDA Div. of Drug Mktg., Adver. & Communications, Remarks at the
Drug Information Association Annual Meeting (June 29, 1999), cited in Pines, supra note 150,
at 498.
167. GAO Report, supra note 162, at 18.
168. Pines, supra note 150, at 504.
169. GAO Report, supra note 162, at 22.
170. DDMAC issues two types of letters to notify companies that they are in violation of
FDA guidelines: (1) Notice of Violation (NOV) Letters (or "untitled letter") are sent for minor
violations, and (2) Warning Letters are sent for more serious violations, as a precursor to FDA
action that will be taken against the manufacturer if it does not initiate corrective action.
Palumbo, supra note 142, at 429. Typically, DDMAC requires that companies take corrective
action by discontinuing the advertisements in violation, responding to DDMAC in writing
within ten to fourteen days indicating their intent to comply, listing all violative advertisements
that will be discontinued, and providing the dates of discontinuation. Id.
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enforcement efforts were of limited effectiveness. 7 ' The report found that
FDA' s enforcement actions "have succeeded in removing from dissemination
misleading DTC advertisements,"' 7 2 but that the agency's efforts were
hampered by its inability to verify that it receives all newly disseminated ads
from pharmaceutical companies. The report also cited a 2001 change in FDA
policy that required all regulatory letters to be issued by FDA's Office of the
Chief Counsel as hampering enforcement efforts.
173
The benefits and harms of DTC advertising are widely debated between and
within interest groups.174 As FDA recently described:
Proponents argue that DTC promotion is of educational value, will
improve the physician-patient relationship, will make consumers
aware of conditions they have that could benefit from treatment,
would potentially improve health care, and could lower long-term
health care costs through early recognition and treatment.
Opponents contend that: Consumers do not have the expertise to
accurately evaluate and comprehend prescription drug advertising,
DTC promotion is typically misleading because it fails to
adequately communicate risk information, DTC promotion will
damage the physician-patient relationship, it will increase drug
prices, lead to over-medication and drug abuse, and it will lead to
use of the most costly alternatives. 
7
1
The Internet has posed the newest challenge for FDA regulation of DTC
prescription drug advertising, and FDA's approach to this medium is still
171. GAO Report, supra note 162, at 17-23.
172. Id. at 21.
173. Id. at 21-22. This requirement has delayed issuance of warning letters for DTC
advertisements, and may have allowed an advertisement to complete its broadcast cycle before
the letter was issued. Id. at 23.
174. The pharmaceutical industry argues that DTC advertising enhances consumer
knowledge, encourages discussion between consumers and physicians, and promotes patient
compliance with drug regimens. The American Medical Association (AMA) has debated the
benefits and harms of DTC advertising. Although many physicians have expressed concern
about the impact on the doctor-patient relationship, the AMA in 1999 issued a policy favoring
DTC advertising within specific guidelines. In contrast, the managed care and health insurance
industries have expressed the concern that DTC advertising will lead to increased demand -
and in turn increased cost - for prescription drugs. Some consumer groups have expressed
concerns over deceptive advertising practices and the lack of objective information weighing
risks and benefits, while others view the ads as positive in that they encourage consumers to
seek health information from healthcare professionals. Palumbo, supra note 142, at 436-40;
Pines, supra note 150, at 508-12; see also Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs of the AMA,
Direct-to-Consumer Advertisements of Prescription Drugs, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 119 (2000).




evolving. Although FDA has been aware for several years of misleading drug
promotions on the Internet, it has been slow to respond. In 1996, after
meeting individually with members of the pharmaceutical industry, FDA held
a public conference to gather information on how the Internet was being used
for drug promotion and what policies and guidance from FDA would be
appropriate. 17 6 William Schultz, then Deputy Commissioner of Policy, stated
that the agency had "no question" that its existing authority over drug
promotion extended to Internet promotion, but acknowledged that "the
Internet raises some new and important and very different issues regarding the
regulation of promotion."' 77
Since the 1996 conference, FDA has initiated enforcement efforts in
response to specific Internet promotions it deems false or misleading or that
promote unapproved drugs or uses.'78 The agency has also conducted periodic
"sweeps" of the Internet to identify promotional materials that violate the
law.'79 FDA continues to study the effect of DTC advertising on consumers
and to seek input from the public. 80 Nevertheless, FDA has yet to issue a
formal regulation or informal guidance document concerning the requirements
for Internet drug promotions. 18
176. FDA, FDA AND THE INTERNET: ADVERTISING ANDPROMOTION OFMEDICALPRODUCTS,
Oct. 16-17, 1996, at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/transcript 1096/fdainet.html.
177. Id.
178. See Leah Brannon, Regulating Drug Promotion on the Internet, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
599, 601 (1999).
179. Id.
180. On September 22-23, 2003, FDA held a public meeting on consumer-directed
promotion of prescription drugs. "The purpose of the meeting [was] to enable the agency and
other persons and organizations to present the results of their research on consumer-directed
promotion of prescription drug products through print, broadcast, and other types of media."
Consumer-Directed Promotion; Public Meeting, at 68 Fed. Reg. 47,920; see, e.g., Nat Ives,
F.D.A. Ponders Pros and Cons of the Ways Prescription Drugs Are Promoted to Consumers,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2003, at C11; Marc Kaufman, Drug Ads Do More Good Than Harm,
FDA Told; Agency Reviewing Effects, Perceptions of Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising, WASH.
POST, Sept. 23, 2003, at E4; Christopher Rowland, A Dose of Reality: FDA to Push Firms to
Make Ads Clearer About Drug Risks, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 2003, at D1. Following the
meeting, on February 4, 2004, FDA issued three draft guidance documents that are "designed
to improve communications to consumers and health care practitioners about health conditions
and medical products." New FDA Draft Guidances Aim to Improve Health Information, FDA
NEWS, Feb. 4, 2004, at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topicslNEWS/2004/NEW 01016.html.
181. Among other issues that remain unclear is FDA's jurisdiction over Internet promotion.
FDA has not stated definitively whether Internet promotions are "labeling" or "advertising."
If they are advertising, then FTC would have primary enforcement jurisdiction over
nonprescription drug promotion. Brannon, supra note 178, at 602-04.
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B. FTC Regulation of Nonprescription Drug Advertising
The FTC is an independent federal agency established by Congress in
1914. 12 Among its mandates, the agency is charged with protecting
consumers against unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent trade practices. The
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) declares unlawful "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce"' 83 and directs the
Commission to prevent such activities.114  The statute also specifically
prohibits the dissemination of false advertising to induce the purchase of
drugs, devices, food, or cosmetics'85 and defines the phrase "false
advertisement" as "misleading in a material respect." 186 The statute directs the
agency to take into account not only representations made for the product, but
also omissions of facts that are material given such representations.
87
To avoid duplicative or inconsistent regulatory efforts, since 1954, FDA
and FTC have operated under working agreements clarifying the roles each
agency plays with respect to advertising oversight. 188 Under the most recent
agreement, FDA has primary authority to regulate prescription drug
advertising, and the FTC has primary authority to regulate OTC drug
advertising. 189
182. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2000)).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000).
184. The 1914 statute prohibited only unfair methods of competition. The Wheeler Lea
Amendment of 1938 expanded the agency's jurisdiction to include unfair and deceptive trade
practices and to prohibit false ads of drugs, cosmetics, etc. Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938
to § 5 of the FTC Act, Pub. L. No. 75-447,52 Stat. 111 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45
(2000)); see also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 52 (2000).
186. Id. § 55(a)(1).
187. Id.
188. Palumbo, supra note 142, at 427-28.
189. Id. at 428 n.38 (citing Memorandum of Understanding, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,538 (Sept. 9,
1971)). Before 1962, the FTC had primary jurisdiction over all drug advertising, both
prescription and nonprescription. Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938 to § 5 of the FTC Act, Pub.
L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000)). At the time the
Wheeler-Lea Act was enacted, the FD&C Act did not distinguish between prescription and
over-the-counter drugs. The Durham-Humphrey Amendments of 1951 added a provision
requiring that drugs that were not safe for use except under medical supervision be dispensed
only by prescription of a licensed practitioner. Durham-Humphrey Amendments of 1951, Pub.
L. No. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(2000)); see also
Palumbo, supra note 142, at 426-27. In 1962, Congress amended the FD&C Act to give FDA
authority over prescription drug advertising. Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of 1962 to Act




The FTC Act does not define the phrase "deceptive acts or practices." In
1983, the FTC issued a policy statement to "provide a concrete indication of
the manner in which the Commission will enforce its deception mandate."' 90
According to the policy statement, the Commission will find that deception
has occurred if there is "a representation, omission or practice that is likely to
mislead the consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances, to the
consumer's detriment."'' The misrepresentation may be written or oral and
may occur at any stage of the transaction. 92 The Commission uses a
consumer-centered approach, asking whether the consumer's interpretation or
reaction is reasonable under the particular circumstances. 93  The
representation, omission, or practice must be material, meaning that it is likely
to affect a consumer's choice or conduct regarding a product.'9" Certain
claims or omissions are considered "presumptively" material, including those
relating to health and safety.' 95 A finding of materiality by the Commission
"is also a finding that injury is likely to exist."' 96 Injury exists if "consumers
would have chosen differently but for the deception."' 97
During the same time period, the FTC also issued a policy statement
concerning unfairness to explicate this provision of the statute.' 98 The
statement provides that in making a determination of unfairness, the agency
will consider whether the practice (1) injures consumers, (2) violates
established public policy, or (3) is unethical or unscrupulous.' 99 Of the three
considerations, the Commission focuses primarily on the injury criteria, using
the other two criteria as additional tools in evaluating the injury.20° According
to the policy statement, for a practice to be unfair, the injury must be
"substantial," causing either monetary harm or "[u]nwarranted health and
safety risks."'20 1 "Emotional impact and other more subjective types of harm"
190. FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, Oct. 14, 1983, at http://www3.ftc.gov/bcp/
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alone, however, will not make a practice unfair,2°2 nor will an advertisement
that "offends the tastes or social beliefs of some viewers., 203 In addition, "the
injury must not be outweighed by any offsetting consumer or competitive
benefits that the sales practice also produces" 204 and must not be one that the
consumer could have avoided. 5
Finally, FTC also has articulated through a policy statement its principles
for determining whether an advertiser has an adequate level of substantiation
to support a claim. 206 The statement is premised on the underlying legal
requirement that advertisers must have a reasonable basis for advertising
claims before they are disseminated.2 7 When a claim of substantiation is
"express," meaning that the claim is literally stated in the advertisement itself,
such as "contains 2 grams of fat," the advertiser must possess "at least the
advertised level of substantiation. '' 208 When an advertisement implies a
particular type or amount of substantiation, the advertiser must possess the
level of support that the ad actually communicates to consumers.20 9 In the
absence of an express or implied level of substantiation, the advertiser must
have a reasonable basis for the claim. 0 The factors that the agency will
consider in determining what constitutes a reasonable basis include the type
of claim, the product, the consequences of a false claim, the benefits of a
truthful claim, the cost of developing substantiation for the claim, and the
amount of substantiation that experts in the field believe is reasonable. 21
Over the years, FTC has undertaken a number of enforcement actions -
often culminating in consent decrees with the company - against
manufacturers of OTC drug products for unfair or deceptive advertising
practices. Most of these cases have involved false claims of therapeutic





206. FTC POLICY STATEMENT REGARDING ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION, 1984, at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/ad3subst.htm; see also Policy Statement Regarding Advertising
Substantiation Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,999 (Aug. 2, 1984).
207. FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 198.
208. Id.; see also Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 318 n.4 (7th Cir. 1992).
209. FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 198.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FFC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Keele Hair &
Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960); Ward Labs. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952
(2d Cir. 1960); Shafe v. FTC, 256 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1958); Koch v. FrC, 206 F.2d 311 (6th
Cir. 1953); Excelsior Lab., Inc. v. FTC, 171 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1948); Irwin v. FTC, 143 F.2d




involved products for which the advertiser claimed superiority to other
products without adequate substantiation, 13 while a few cases involved claims
that did not adequately limit the product's benefit214 or that implied the
presence of certain ingredients.1 5
Like FDA, FTC has broadened its mandate to include internet-based
advertising. In 1999, FTC launched Operation Cure.All, a law enforcement
and consumer education campaign, as a means to target false and
unsubstantiated online health claims promoting products and services as cures
or treatment for serious diseases." 6 Operation Cure.All provides information
to consumers on how to recognize health fraud, and guidance for businesses
on how to market health products and services truthfully.2"7 FTC has
conducted periodic sweeps of the Internet and sent email advisories warning
companies of violations." 8
C. Lessons
FDA's arguable lack of jurisdiction over genetic testing services precludes
wholesale application of its pharmaceutical advertising approach to genetic
testing. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the flaws in FDA's regulation of
DTC pharmaceutical advertising, FDA's approach does contain elements that
could be adapted to a policy aimed at genetic testing. FDA's advertising
policy does not seek to ban advertising but rather to ensure that information
is truthful and balanced. Both benefits and risks must be communicated, and
consumers must be given the tools to find out more information. Any
oversight strategy for genetic test advertising should ensure that both risks and
benefits are disclosed, and aid consumers in finding out more information.
213. See, e.g., Novartis Corp. v. FTC, 223 F.3d 783 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Bristol-Myers Co. v.
FrC, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Ci. 1984);
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982); FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317
F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 185 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950).
214. See, e.g., J.B. Williams, Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 889-90 (6th Cir. 1967) (noting that
claims for Geritol falsely implied benefit in those not experiencing iron deficiency anemia); Feil
v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 901 (9th Cir. 1960) (requiring claims for eneuresis device to include
statement that product benefit limited to cases not involving organic defects or diseases).
215. See, e.g., Thompson Med. Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (requiring
disclaimer that Aspercreme does not contain aspirin).
216. FTC, "Operation Cure.all" Targets Internet Health Fraud (June 24, 1999), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/06/opcureall.htm [hereinafter FTC, Operation Cure.all]; FTC,
OPERATION CURE ALL, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/cureall [hereinafter FTC,
OPERATION CURE ALL].
217. FTC, OPERATION CURE ALL, supra note 216.
218. FrC, Operation Cure.all, supra note 216; Washington Internet Project, FTC Operation
Cure.all, at http://www.cybertelecom.org/emed.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2004).
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Unlike prescription drugs, however, many genetic tests do not require a
physician's prescription, which eliminates a potential gatekeeper and makes
it more critical that consumers are given correct information.
FDA's experience with DTC pharmaceutical advertising has also shown
that it is difficult for a government agency to monitor commercial
communications despite clear regulatory jurisdiction, and also highlights the
need for, but difficulty of, collecting data to demonstrate advertising's impact
on consumers. In addition, FDA must also be increasingly cognizant of the
potential legal challenges on First Amendment grounds to any enforcement
effort undertaken by the agency.2" 9 Although no such action has been brought
in the context of prescription drugs, both the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit have struck down agency efforts to limit
speech in other contexts on the ground that they violated the First
Amendment.22°
FTC, in contrast to FDA, regulates not by category of product but based on
the content of speech. This is the case whether the advertisement promotes
widgets, weight loss aids, or attorney services. Thus, no jurisdictional barrier
exists to FTC oversight of advertising claims for genetic tests. As a practical
matter, however, FTC is a fairly small agency and must make choices about
where to focus its limited resources. 22' Historically, FTC has focused its
efforts on health products whose false or deceptive claims would cause
concrete harm to a large number of people. Thus, a decision by FTC to focus
on genetic testing would be influenced, at least in part, by a showing of
concrete harm to consumers from the use of these products as a result of
claims made in advertising. Currently, such data does not exist.
In addition, FTC's authority is limited to ensuring that advertising claims
do not deceive consumers. This is a relatively limited mandate because it does
not permit FTC to evaluate whether there is an overall benefit to consumers
from receiving certain information. Rather, the agency is limited to
determining whether the information consumers are receiving is inaccurate or
creates a false impression. To the extent FTC went beyond policing fraud and
deception, it too could face a challenge that it was violating free speech rights
of advertisers. The Supreme Court has not explored the boundary between
219. See infra Part VI.
220. See infra notes 273-88 and accompanying text.
221. See generally Testimony of Matthew Daynard, Senior Attorney, Advertising Practices
Division, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Before the Secretary's
Advisory Committee on Genetics Health and Society, October 22-23, 2003, at
http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/meetings/October2003/Daynard tr.pdf (last visited Apr.





what is truthful and what is misleading, and drawing this line may be
particularly difficult.
VI. Commercial Speech Doctrine
A. Evolution of Commercial Speech Doctrine
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. '2
The First Amendment constrains the government, including both state
governments and the federal government, from suppressing speech by private
citizens, even if the subject matter is factually wrong or offensive.223
Although government may, consistent with the First Amendment, exert some
control over the physical and temporal attributes of speech, the so-called
"time, place, and manner" restrictions, 22 it generally may not prohibit
communications based on their content. 225 The general prohibition on content-
based restrictions of speech applies equally to speech concerning matters of
public health. In other words, the potentially detrimental effect of a particular
communication on the health of an individual or population does not justify
226government suppression.
Several rationales have been given for such broad protection of speech.
The right of the individual to free expression is thought to advance the values
of (1) individual self-fulfillment, (2) attainment of the truth, (3) societal
participation in social and political decisionmaking, and (4) maintaining a
balance between stability and change within society.227 The second value, that
of truth, has been encapsulated in the metaphor of a "marketplace of ideas."228
In his 1919 dissent in Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes, citing the
writings of John Stuart Mill, stated that
222. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
223. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
224. See, e.g., Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808
(1984). The Supreme Court has stated that time, place, and manner restrictions do not violate
the First Amendment "provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Clark
v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
225. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988).
226. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001).
227. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963), excerpted in RUSSELL L. WEAVER & ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 8 (2002).
228. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); see also Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. at 804; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe ... that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market. 229
Under the marketplace rationale, permitting unfettered expression exposes
false ideas to debate and rejection, while permitting truth to be discovered.
As Mill stated,
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that
it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than
those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what
is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.30
Certain classes of speech, however, have been categorically excluded from
First Amendment protection. The exclusions stem not from the text of the
First Amendment, but rather from Supreme Court interpretations. In
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,23' the Court opined that "[t]here are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem." '232 The Court listed these categories as: "the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words." '233 From this and
other cases, the following categories of speech have been historically excluded
from First Amendment protection: (1) obscenity, (2) fighting words, (3)
incitement, and (4) defamation.3 Jurisprudence that has developed has
attempted to define, and in some cases, strictly limit the exemption of each of
these categories. In contrast to speech fostering the ideals discussed above,
these excluded categories of speech have been considered to constitute "no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
229. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
230. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (1999) (1869), at http://www.bartleby.com/
25/2/2.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
231. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
232. Id. at 571-72.
233. Id. at 572.
234. RUSSELL L. WEAVER & ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES,




a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
235
Until recently, many believed that speech relating to commercial
transactions and activities - what has become known as "commercial
speech" - was also categorically excluded from First Amendment
protection.6 In the 1942 case Valentine v. Chrestensen,237 which was decided
shortly after Chaplinsky, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the use of
city streets for "commercial and business advertising matter.' 'z38 In a terse
opinion, the Court ruled that, whereas "the streets are proper places for the
exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating
opinion ' '2 9 and thus the government is constrained from prohibiting such
activities,
the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising. Whether, and to what
extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the
streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation
of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment.24
The Court did not revisit the issue again for over thirty years. In the 1975
case Bigelow v. Virginia,24 however, the Court struck down an ordinance that
would have prohibited a newspaper from carrying an advertisement informing
the public that abortions were legal in New York and offering assistance in
obtaining abortion services. The Court held that "speech is not stripped of
First Amendment protection merely because it appears" in the form of a paid
commercial advertisement. 42 The Court limited the effect of Chrestensen,
stating that the case did not provide "authority for the proposition that all
statutes regulating commercial advertising are immune from constitutional
challenge, ' 243 and "does not support any sweeping proposition that advertising
235. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
236. But cf Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not "Low Value" Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 85,
92-93 (1999) (arguing that the Framers of the Constitution believed that the right to advertise
was encompassed within the First Amendment's protection of freedom of the press and that they
did not intend to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech, but rather
between truthful and false speech).
237. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
238. Id. at 53.
239. Id. at 54.
240. Id.
241. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
242. Id. at 818.
243. Id. at 820.
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is unprotected per se. ''244 While the Bigelow decision dealt with speech that
had both commercial and noncommercial aspects, in that it "conveyed
information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience - not only
to readers possibly in need of the services offered,"2 45 the Court confronted the
issue of "pure" commercial advertising head-on the following year. In
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,246
the Court struck down a Virginia law prohibiting pharmacists from advertising
the price of prescription drugs. The state argued that the restriction was
necessary to protect consumers because permitting price advertising would
undermine the professionalism of pharmacists and jeopardize the customer-
pharmacist relationship.247 By requiring pharmacists to compete as to price,
the state feared that the quality of pharmacists' service to customers would
decline to the customers' detriment.2 48 The Court, after acknowledging that
its holding in Chrestensen had "all but passed from the scene' 249 in the wake
of subsequent cases, formally recognized that speech that does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction"'25 was protected by the First Amendment.
The Court noted the important interests furthered by commercial speech. "As
to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest
in the day's most urgent political debate."25' With respect to pharmaceutical
price advertising specifically, the Court noted that suppression of prescription
drug price advertising would in particular harm the poor, the sick, and the
disabled, who spend a disproportionate amount of their income on prescription
drugs, but who have limited ability to comparison shop.252 The Court also
noted the societal interest in the free flow of commercial information:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter
244. Id.
245. Id. at 822.
246. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
247. Id. at 766-67.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 759.
250. Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376,385
(1973)).





of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable. 3
Responding to the concerns raised by the State that consumers would
choose low-cost, low-quality pharmacy services, the Court stated:
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not
in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests
if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to
that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to
close them.254
The Court concluded that the state could not suppress truthful information
about a lawful activity solely because of its concerns about the effect of the
information on the disseminators and the recipients of that information. 55
Notwithstanding its recognition of the value of commercial speech that
warranted First Amendment protection, the Court nevertheless noted factors
that distinguished commercial speech from other types of protected speech.
First, whether commercial speech is truthful "may be more easily verifiable
by its disseminator"25 6 than other types of speech because the advertiser is in
a position to know about the product. Second, commercial speech is more
"durable" than other kinds of speech because the profit motive will insulate
it from the chilling effect of government regulation.257 "[T]he greater
objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech... may make it less necessary
to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.
258
B. Central Hudson
Following Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court considered
commercial speech in a variety of contexts, 259 including lawyer and other
professional advertising. 26° Through these cases, the Court formalized its
commercial speech doctrine, which was articulated in the 1980 case Central
253. Id. at 765.
254. Id. at 770.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 772 n.24.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
260. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Assoc., 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission.2 6' In this
case, the Court articulated a four-part balancing test for determining whether
a particular government restriction of commercial speech comported with the
First Amendment. Under this test, a court must first determine whether the
speech being restricted is misleading or concerns an unlawful activity. 26 2 Only
speech that is truthful and relates to a lawful activity merits First Amendment
protection. Assuming that this first criterion is satisfied, the burden shifts to
the government to demonstrate that it has a substantial interest in restricting
the speech at issue.2 63 Third, the restriction must directly advance the state
interest involved 6.2  Restrictions that provide only "ineffective or remote
support for the government's purpose" will not be upheld.265 Finally, the
restriction must not be more restrictive than necessary to achieve the
governmental interest.266 This step examines the "fit" between the interest and
means chosen to achieve it.267 The government must not merely show that its
regulation directly advances an important objective, but also that the means
used are not more extensive than necessary to achieve that goal.2 68
Although some on the Court, most notably Justice Thomas, have advocated
abolishing any distinction between commercial and fully protected speech, 26 9
the Central Hudson test has been repeatedly reaffirmed by a majority of the
Court. What has changed, however, is the degree of rigor with which the test
has been applied by some justices, in particular, with regard to the test's third
and fourth prongs. While in earlier cases the Court had accepted a variety
of restrictions to directly advance the state's interest in a manner that was not
unduly restrictive,"' in recent years the Court, though highly fragmented, has
261. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).







269. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525. 572 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech
in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech
in question may be characterized as 'commercial.'"); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that where "legal users of a product or
service [are kept] ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the balancing
test adopted in Central Hudson ... should not be applied .... ).
270. See Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Regulation and the Constitution After Western States,
37 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 901,903 (2003) (noting that "while the Justices use the same [Central
Hudson] test, they differ on its meaning in practice").




imposed a much higher burden on the government to articulate the link
between the ends sought and the means used. 72 In the 2001 case Lorillard
Tobacco Company v. Reilly,273 the Court struck down a Massachusetts
regulation that, among other restrictions, would have prohibited the
advertising of cigarettes, cigars, or smokeless tobacco products within one
thousand feet of any school or playground.274 Six members of the Court were
satisfied that the state's interest was directly advanced by the restrictions on
outdoor cigar and smokeless tobacco advertising, 275 thus meeting the standard
in the third prong of Central Hudson. Five members of the Court, however,
held that the one-thousand-foot rule was more extensive than necessary to
serve the state's interests, thus failing to satisfy the fourth prong of Central
Hudson.276 Specifically, they found that the attorney general did not
"carefully calculate the costs and benefits associated with the burden on
speech imposed by the regulations., 277 For example, they stated that the
attorney general did not consider the impact of the restriction in metropolitan
areas, which would be greater than in rural areas such that "[t]he uniformly
broad sweep of the geographical limitation demonstrates a lack of
tailoring. 278 In the Court's opinion,
A careful calculation of the costs of a speech regulation does not
mean that a State must demonstrate that there is no incursion on
legitimate speech interests, but a speech regulation cannot unduly
impinge on the speaker's ability to propose a commercial
(upholding Puerto Rico law prohibiting casino advertising, finding that the government's
interest in reducing the demand for casino gambling by residents of Puerto Rico was substantial,
that the regulations directly advanced the government's interest, and the restrictions were no
more extensive than necessary to serve the government's interest).
272. See, e.g., 44 Liquornart, 517 U.S. at 504 (unanimously overturning state ban on liquor
price advertising ban, but disagreeing on whether the state's failure related to the direct
advancement or reasonable fit prong of Central Hudson); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476, 486-91 (1995) (finding that the federal government prohibition on the display of
alcohol content on beer labels did not sufficiently advance the government interest in protecting
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens).
273. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
274. Id. at550-51.
275. Because the Court concluded that the restrictions on cigarette advertising were
preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, it did not render an opinion
regarding whether the cigarette advertising restrictions violated the First Amendment. Id. at
550.
276. Id. at 563-65.
277. Id. at 561 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
278. Id. at 563.
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transaction and the adult listeners opportunity to obtain
information about products.279
In the 2002 case of Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,280 a six-
member majority of the Court struck down a provision of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) that would have
prohibited pharmacists from advertising compounded drugs.28' Compounded
drugs are those that are not commercially available and are tailored by
pharmacists to meet the needs of a specific patient in response to a valid
prescription.282 The FDAMA exempted the activity of compounding from the
premarket approval requirements under which new drugs ordinarily must
demonstrate safety and effectiveness before they can be approved for
marketing.283 FDA argued that the restriction on advertising was necessary to
balance the interest of providing compounded drugs to patients who require
them and preserving the integrity of the premarket approval process by
ensuring that compounding remains on a small scale.284 While the Court
agreed that the government's interest in achieving this objective was
substantial and that the means chosen might directly achieve that objective,
it concluded that the government had not shown its methods were not more
restrictive than necessary. 285 The Court noted that several nonspeech
restrictive alternatives could have been used to draw a line between
compounding and large scale manufacturing, such as limiting the number of
compounded drugs sold by a particular pharmacist or pharmacy, or by
prohibiting the use of commercial scale equipment to compounded drugs. 286
According to the Court, "The Government simply has not provided sufficient
justification here. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that
regulating speech must be a last - not first - resort. Yet here it seems to
have been the first strategy the Government thought to try. '"287
C. Compelled Commercial Speech
Not only does the First Amendment protect the right to speak, but it also
protects the right to refrain from speaking. The Court has articulated two
279. Id. at 565.
280. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
281. Id. at 377.
282. For example, a patient may require a dosage form not commercially available or have
an allergy to a specific ingredient. Id. at 360-61.
283. Id. at 360.
284. Id. at 364.
285. Id. at 373.
286. Id. at 372.




complementary rationales for affording First Amendment protection to
compelled speech. First, to compel a person to enunciate a view in which he
does not believe violates the freedom of conscience or belief.288 This
reasoning was used to invalidate state laws that make flag salute and pledge
compulsory,289 or that require automobile owners to display license plates
carrying the state motto, "Live Free or Die. 29°  Second, government-
compelled speech may deter speakers from expressing their own views.29'
The Court struck down state laws that prohibit anonymous handbills2 92 or
campaign literature 293 because the laws discouraged the person's underlying
right to publish and disseminate written works.
The U.S. Supreme Court's compelled-speech jurisprudence is principally
concerned with political and social discourse, as opposed to product health
and safety.294 In United States v. United Foods, Inc. ,295 however, the Court
made clear that its compelled speech doctrine applies to commercial speech. 96
In that case, the Court held that a federal statute requiring mushroom
producers and importers to pay for generic advertising promoting the
mushroom industry is coerced speech: "First Amendment values are at
serious risk if the government can compel [citizens to subsidize speech] on the
side that it favors. 297
288. Lawrence 0. Gostin & Gail H. Javitt, Health Promotion and the First Amendment:
Government Control of the Informational Environment, 79 MILBANK Q. 547, 560 (2001).
289. W.V. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
290. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
291. Gostin & Javitt, supra note 288, at 560.
292. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
293. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
294. For example, in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 796
(1988), the Court declined to use a commercial speech test in striking down a statute mandating
professional fundraisers to disclose the percentage of charitable contributions actually turned
over to charity. "[E]ven assuming ... that [the mandated] speech in the abstract is indeed
merely 'commercial,' we do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character when
it is inextricably intertwined with the otherwise fully protected speech [involved in charitable
solicitations]." Id.
295. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
296. Id. at 413-16. The Court decided the case based on its compelled-speechjurisprudence
and did not apply the Central Hudson test. Nevertheless, some legal commentators view the
United Foods case as a victory for constitutional protections of commercial speech. See DAVID
L. HUDSON, JR., COMPELLED ADVERTISING, at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/Speech/
advertising/topic.aspx?topic=compelled (last updated Mar. 26, 2004).
297. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411. Four years earlier, in Gliclanan v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997), the Court upheld similar federal marketing orders requiring
California fruit producers to fund a generic advertising program, characterizing the orders as
economic regulation that did not impinge on First Amendment rights. See Nicole B. Casarez,
Don't Tell Me What to Say: Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 63 Mo.
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Lower courts have also grappled with the circumstances under which the
government may compel disclosures in the commercial context. In
International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy,29s dairy manufacturers
challenged a Vermont law that required the labeling of products from cows
treated with recombinant Bovine Somatotropin (rBST), a synthetic growth
hormone that increases milk production. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit analyzed the regulation under Central Hudson, concluding that
the asserted government interest of "consumer curiosity" was insufficiently
strong to justify the regulation.299
In other circumstances, lower courts have viewed compelled disclosure as
preferable to an outright ban on speech. In Pearson v. Shalala, °° the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down an FDA regulation
requiring prior approval of "health claims" '' for dietary supplements. °2 FDA
required that such claims be supported by "significant scientific agreement,"
an agency-defined and enforced standard.0 3 The court held that the
significant scientific agreement standard was unconstitutional because it
precluded manufacturers from making claims having less scientific support in
conjunction with a disclaimer, stating:
L. REV. 929, 930 (1998). The Court in United Foods, Inc. distinguished its prior ruling by
reasoning that the exaction in Glickman was ancillary to a comprehensive regulatory program
that included several competition-displacing features. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411-12. In
contrast, the federal statute in United Foods had no regulatory objective other than generic
advertising. Id. at 412.
298. 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
299. Id. at 74.
300. 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
301. A "health claim" is "any claim made on the label or in labeling of a food, including a
dietary supplement, that ... characterizes the relationship of any substance to a disease or
health-related condition." 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(l) (2003).
302. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 660-61. The claims at issue in the case were that consumption of
antioxidant vitamins may reduce the risk of certain kinds of cancer, that consumption of fiber
may reduce the risk of colorectal cancer, that consumption of omega-3 fatty acids may reduce
the risk of coronary heart disease, and that 0.8 mg of folic acid in a dietary supplement is more
effective in reducing the risk of neural tube defects than a lower amount in foods in common
form. Id. at 652.
303. Id. at 653 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B)(I) (1972 & Supp. 1998)). The regulation
at issue stated that FDA would authorize a health claim
only when it determines, based on the totality of publicly available scientific
evidence (including evidence from well-designed studies conducted in a manner
which is consistent with generally recognized scientific procedures and
principles), that there is significant scientific agreement, among experts qualified
by scientific training and experience to evaluate such claims, that the claim is
supported by such evidence.
21 C.F.R. § 101.14(c).
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It is clear . . . that when government chooses a policy of
suppression over disclosure - at least where there is no showing
that disclosure would not suffice to cure misleadingness -
government disregards a 'far less restrictive' means.
D. Misleading Speech
The first prong of the Central Hudson test makes clear that First
Amendment protection will be afforded only to truthful commercial speech
about a lawful activity. Commercial speech that is misleading, deceptive, or
untruthful, or concerns illegal activity, is outside the protection of the First
Amendment. As the Court explained in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. :305
Not only does regulation of inaccurate commercial speech exclude
little truthful speech from the market, but false or misleading
speech in the commercial realm also lacks the value that sometimes
inheres in false or misleading political speech. Transaction-driven
speech usually does not touch on a subject of public debate, and
thus misleading statements in that context are unlikely to engender
the beneficial public discourse that flows from political
controversy. Moreover, the consequences of false commercial
speech can be particularly severe: Investors may lose their savings,
and consumers may purchase products that are more dangerous
than they believe or that do not work as advertised. Finally,
because commercial speech often occurs in the place of sale,
consumers may respond to the falsehood before there is time for
more speech and considered reflection to minimize the risks of
being misled. °6
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has provided little guidance to aid in a
determination of what is misleading commercial speech. For the most part,
cases decided by the Court have involved challenges to government
restrictions of speech acknowledged by both sides to be truthful. In a few
instances - mostly involving professional advertising - the Court has
addressed contentions by the government that certain types of advertising will
mislead consumers. 3° These opinions have not dealt in any depth with what
304. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 658.
305. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
306. Id. at 496.
307. See, e.g., Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994)
(finding that attorney's use of CPA and CFT designation were not misleading provided that she
held active CPA and CFT licenses); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496
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factors should be used to assess whether a particular communication is
deceptive or misleading. 3 8 Additionally, the Court has indicated that even
where speech is potentially misleading, the remedy is additional disclosure,
such as mandated warning labels, and not a categorical ban.309
VII. Regulation of Genetic Tests Within the Bounds of the First Amendment
Critics of direct-to-consumer marketing of genetic tests raise concerns
implicating both the sale and advertising of these tests.3t ° First, they argue
that the tests should be available only through a health care provider and in the
context of genetic counseling. This critique relates to how the tests are sold.
To address this concern, regulations could be imposed regarding, for example,
the level of data required before a test can be offered, who is authorized to
provide the testing services, and who is permitted to order the test and receive
the results. Regulations addressing the prerequisites for and manner of sale
could be imposed at the federal or state level. Though it remains unclear
whether federal agencies currently have sufficient jurisdiction to implement
such requirements, there is no constitutional barrier to their moving
forward,31 ' and Congress could clarify, and if necessary, expand their
U.S. 91 (1990) (holding that attorney's letterhead stating that he was a "Certified Civil Trial
Specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy" was not actually or inherently misleading
where the information was true and verifiable, and the potential for the information to mislead
was insufficient to warrant a categorical ban); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (affirming that advertising contingent fee
arrangement without disclosing the need to pay legal costs was deceptive and misleading, but
that advertisements offering to represent previous users of a defective birth control device were
not, because the offer did not promise a successful outcome or suggest that the attorney had
special expertise).
308. Gostin & Javitt, supra note 288, at 563.
309. For example, in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002), the
Court stated that
[e]ven if the Government did argue that it had an interest in preventing misleading
advertisements, this interest could be satisfied by the far less restrictive alternative
of requiring each compounded drug to be labeled with a warning that the drug had
not undergone FDA testing and that its risks were unknown.
Id. at 376.
310. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
311. The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to "regulate commerce.. . among the
several states." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Thus, the Commerce Clause permits Congress to enact
legislation affecting a wide variety of activities and products, provided that the activities involve
interstate commerce. Because clinical laboratories typically operate in more than one state, and
receive materials and send test results across state lines, there is likely to be the requisite
interstate commerce nexus present for federal legislation. States, through their police powers,
have the authority to regulate to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens, see




jurisdiction by enacting new legislation.
Second, critics argue that consumers may be confused or misled by the
claims made in advertising for genetic tests and that the government should
restrict consumer-directed advertising. With respect to restricting advertising
claims, however, the constraints of the First Amendment require a cautious
approach. A court would likely categorize promotional speech concerning
genetic testing as commercial speech, and impose the Central Hudson
analytical framework in evaluating any restriction. Thus, the first question a
court would ask is whether the speech concerns a lawful activity.31 In the
absence of any laws prohibiting the sale of genetic tests, such speech would
be lawful. Some states prohibit direct access testing; thus, to the extent an
advertisement offered services directly to consumers in a state in which it was
prohibited, this could be considered unlawful activity.
Assuming lawful activity, the next question under Central Hudson is
whether the speech is misleading." 3 As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme
Court has spent minimal time in its decisions discussing the parameters of
misleading speech. Speech that is blatantly false would no doubt fail this
component of Central Hudson. Thus, for example, an advertisement claiming
that a genetic test can reveal information for which no scientific basis exists,
such as predicting who you will marry, or whether you will win the lottery,
would not be protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, these are the types
of specious claims that FTC is clearly currently authorized to prohibit.314
Whether FTC would choose to pursue blatantly false claims for genetic tests
is a matter of enforcement discretion, and FTC would likely take into account
the magnitude of the harm caused by such testing and the number of people
affected in deciding whether to take action.3"'
It is likely that at least some genetic testing advertisements are not false on
their face, but may nevertheless have the potential to mislead because, for
example, they overstate the potential benefits, minimize potential risks, or
imply a greater level of scientific support than actually exists to support the
claim. A court might agree with a government assertion that such speech was
potentially misleading. Nevertheless, based on the limited precedent
available, a court would also likely conclude that an appropriate remedy for
such misleading speech is not a wholesale ban on all genetic testing
tests.
312. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64
(1980).
313. Id.
314. See supra Part V.B.
315. See generally Testimony of Matthew Daynard, supra note 221.
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advertising, but rather a requirement to disclose additional information to
remedy the misleading perception that the advertisement created.316
Assuming that the speech at issue was truthful, even if potentially
misleading, the burden would shift to the government to demonstrate that a
restriction on speech served a substantial interest. 17  An asserted
governmental interest in protecting the public's health would almost certainly
be considered substantial, and a court would likely accept as substantial the
government's desire to prevent at least some of the harms that critics of DTC
genetic testing have asserted.318
A finding that the asserted interest is substantial, however, does not by
itself mean that government restrictions of speech protecting the public's
health are warranted. The third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson require
the government to show that speech restrictions are a direct means of
protecting the public, and that such restrictions are narrowly tailored to
achieve this goal. 3 '9 The First Amendment requires that speech restrictions be
a last resort, not a first step, in such protection. Accordingly, it is most often
at this stage of the Central Hudson analysis that the government fails to meet
its burden.
A key element of succeeding in the third and fourth steps is being able to
convincingly support the connection between the interest the government
seeks to achieve and the means chosen to achieve it. In the case of genetic
testing, the government would need to demonstrate that restricting the
advertising of genetic tests will directly prevent the asserted harms and that
such restrictions are a sufficiently narrowly tailored means to achieve this
objective. While it is unclear what type or degree of evidence a court would
require to make such a demonstration,320 achieving an adequate level of
evidence would likely be difficult in the case of genetic testing. While the
CDC has been monitoring consumer reaction to genetic testing,32" ' few data
have emerged to date. Furthermore, assessing the actual impact of advertising
on consumer behavior is generally difficult,322 and would likely be difficult
with respect to genetic testing as well. A court would also likely be skeptical
316. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Pearson v. Shalala,
164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
317. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
318. See supra Part IH.B.
319. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
320. The Court has not yet indicated the level of evidence needed to support speech
restrictions. Gostin & Javitt, supra note 288, at 558 n.7.
321. See CLIAC SUMMARY REPORT, Sept. 17-18,2003, Addendum P, at http://www.phppo.
cdc.gov/cliac/pdf/CLAC0903.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).





of arguments that advertising restrictions were necessary because of consumer
ignorance or difficulty in making independent decisions, and might view such
arguments as reflecting unwarranted paternalism. In the absence of adequate
evidence to show that restricting advertising will directly advance the
government's interest and that there are not less speech-restrictive means of
doing so - such as more effectively regulating the tests themselves - it
would be difficult for the government to satisfy the direct advancement
requirement of Central Hudson.
Even if the government could show a direct connection between restricting
advertisements and preventing consumer harm, the government would still
need to show that restricting advertising is not more restrictive than necessary
to achieve its purpose." 3 The government would need to show that any
restrictions were carefully targeted and did not sweep in more speech than
necessary to avoid the asserted harms. Crafting restrictions to prohibit those
claims without any merit while not unduly impinging on valid claims would
be challenging. Courts would likely look for some evidence that the
government had diligently endeavored to determine the consequences of any
restriction on all advertising, not just the speech specifically targeted for
restriction.
Requiring limited disclosures to avoid misleading consumers would be
more likely to satisfy the requirements of Central Hudson. The government
would need adequate evidence to demonstrate that restricting advertisements
would directly advance its interests in protecting consumers from the asserted
harms from DTC advertising, and that the restrictions did not impinge on more
speech than necessary to achieve this interest.
VIII. Conclusion
The number and type of genetic tests available continues to increase, and
such tests are playing an increasingly important role in health care. These
tests provide information regarding a person's current or potential future
health status - information with significant consequences for both
individuals and their family members.
Many critics lament both the lack of federal oversight of genetic tests and
the increasing efforts by some companies to promote and sell them directly to
consumers. Yet there has been little careful analysis of either the regulatory
environment in which these tests are provided, or the constitutional constraints
implicated when the government restricts commercial communications.
While there is no constitutional barrier to government regulation of the sale
of genetic tests, currently little federal or state oversight exists, especially
323. Central Hudson, 557 U.S. at 564.
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when compared with medical products, such as drugs and devices. This lack
of oversight of the sale of tests has arguably contributed to some critics' desire
to prohibit advertising. The Constitution also does not prohibit the
government from restraining clearly false or misleading advertising claims for
genetic tests, but FTC has not yet undertaken a review of the claims being
made for these tests.
Constitutional protections would, however, be implicated were the
government to prohibit truthful, nonmisleading claims about genetic tests.
The government would need to support any restrictions on speech with
adequate evidence, which may not yet exist, that such restrictions will directly
advance its interest and are a narrowly tailored means of doing so. Limited
and more narrowly focused requirements, such as the requirement for greater
disclosure of information or the use of disclaimers in advertisements, would
be more likely to survive judicial scrutiny.
Clearly, the First Amendment in no way restricts the government or private
parties from adding their voices to that of commercial interests in the service
of protecting consumers. Indeed, the premise of the "marketplace of ideas" -
that more speech is better than less and that truthful ideas will win out over
false ones if all are permitted to be heard - applies to genetic testing as well.
The government, through its many public health-related agencies, can educate
and warn consumers about the limitations, pitfalls, and dangers of genetic
testing using the same media used by advertisers of such tests. As the recent
statement by the American College of Medical Genetics indicates,324
professional groups can, and should, voice their concerns regarding the
potential harms of DTC testing to educate providers and the public about the
appropriate uses of such tests.
324. See supra note 7.
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